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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I present three distinct essays in health and public economics. In chapter 2, 
using Vital Statistics data from National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and a Difference in 
Difference methodology, I investigate the impact of the Paid Family Leave (PFL) of California on 
birth delay, infant health, and labor market outcomes of mothers after first childbirth. I find that 
PFL of California reduces birth delay by encouraging women to have their first child earlier. 
Results are more pronounced for older women who are over the age of 35. This policy also 
improves infant health by reducing incidence of low birth weight (<2500 grams), premature (<37 
weeks of gestation), and cesarean-born infants of older mothers. Furthermore, results show that 
PFL policy improves labor market attachment by increasing the likelihood of employment after 
childbirth for college educated women who are more likely to exit the labor force after childbirth. 
Chapter 3, investigates the impact of the biggest oil spill in the U.S. history in the Gulf of Mexico 
in 2010 on air quality and health outcomes of newborns. Using Vital Statistics data from National 
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), air quality data from the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, and a Difference in Difference methodology, I find that oil spill of 2010 reduces air 
quality and increases the incidence of low birth weight and premature newborns. Heterogeneity 
effects show higher adverse health impacts for black mothers, less educated mothers, unmarried, 
and mothers less than 20 years old. 
Chapter 4 examines whether the party affiliation of governors (Democrat or Republican) has an 
impact on the allocation of state expenditures. Exploiting gubernatorial election results from 1960 
to 2012 and a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), we find that Democratic governors allocate 
a larger share of their budget to health/hospitals and education sectors. We find no significant 
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impact of the political party of governors on total spending, only on the allocation of funds. The 
results are robust to a wide range of controls and model specifications.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three distinct essays within the field of health and public economics. 
In chapter 2, I investigate the impact of the Paid Family Leave (PFL) of California on three main 
outcome variables including timing of the first birth, infant health outcomes (incidence of low birth 
weight and premature newborns as well as gestation in weeks, and birth weight in grams), and 
labor market outcomes (employment, weeks of work, and hours of work) of mothers after their 
first childbirths. Chapter 3 examines the impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010 on air quality and infant health outcomes. In chapter 4, I study whether party 
affiliation of governors (Democrat or Republican) has an impact on the allocation of state 
expenditure. Chapter 5, summarizes the findings of these three essays. 
1.1 Impact of Paid Family Leave of California on Delayed Childbearing and on Infant Health 
Outcomes 
Delayed childbearing traditionally has been defined as pregnancy for women over the age of 35 
and is an increasing phenomenon. Average age at first birth is a key variable of interest to both 
policy makers and scholars since it plays a strong role in a wide range of birth outcomes (eg., low 
birth weight, multiple births, and birth defects). Maternal age at first birth also influences total 
number of births that a woman might have which impacts the size, composition and future growth 
of the population (NCHS Data Brief, 2009, Johonson and Tough, 2012; NCHS, 2014; Cnattingius 
et al., 1993; Guendelman et al., 2014).  
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The U.S. is one of the four nations with the absence or limited maternity leave polices which makes 
it hard for families specially women to sustain balance between work and family obligations.1 
Having no or limited job and income security at the time of childbirth is one of the main challenges 
that women have faced in the labor force and has left them with few options including postponing 
the decision of having a child, exiting the labor force work after childbirth, or returning 
immediately to the job which is accompanied with limited bonding between mother and newborn 
as well as absence or limited breastfeeding. Among existing options, delayed childbearing has 
been more pronounced especially among college educate mothers who have higher desire to first 
stablish their careers and avoid motherhood wage penalty (Fass, 2009; Buckles, 2008). 
In 2004, California introduces a universal Paid Family Leave (PFL) policy which provides up to 
six weeks paid family leave with 55 percent wage replacement to bond with a newborn child.2 
Findings of this paper provide insights into the implementation of the PFL policy. This paper 
estimates the causal impact of Paid Family Leave (PFL) act of California on timing of the first 
births, infant health outcomes, and labor market outcomes of women after first childbirth. Using a 
Difference in Difference (DID) methodology and Vital Statistics data from National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS), I find that PFL of California reduces birth delay by encouraging women 
over 35 years old to have their first child 2 years earlier on average. Heterogeneity effects reveal 
more pronounced effect on college educated women. In general, college educated women show 
greater tendency to delay or avoid childbearing altogether since they face higher motherhood 
                                                 
1 Labor force participation of women has increased from 33.9 percent in 1950 to more than 57 percent in 2014 (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics). However, labor market has not been adjusted to this huge increase in the female labor force 
participation in terms of maternal leave policies. 
2 Prior to PFL, the U.S. federal government introduced the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) which provides 
12 weeks unpaid but job protected leave from work. However, unpaid leave as well as high restricted eligibility criteria 
in terms of firm size, location, and minimum hours of work make FMLA far from universal coverage. 
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penalties for exiting the labor force to care for their children. However, results show that providing 
maternity leave such as the generous PFL of California encourages college educated women to 
hasten their decision to have their first child. 
I also find that PFL of California improves infant health outcomes of new mothers over 35 years 
old by decreasing incidence of low birth weight (<2500 g), premature (< 37 weeks of gestation), 
and cesarean-born infants. Improved infant health is one main evidence of reduction in birth delay 
following implementation of the PFL policy. However, this policy has no significant impact on 
infant health outcomes of new mothers less than 35 years old who are already in normal 
childbearing age. I also explore the impact of this policy on labor market outcomes. Not only does 
PFL of California decrease birth delay for college graduated women over 35 years old, but it also 
improves labor market attachment by increasing the likelihood of employment after childbirth. 
This is important because the related literature presents that one salient change after childbirth for 
college educated women is an increase in the likelihood of absenteeism and exit from labor force. 
Results are robust to a wide range of controls and robustness checks including different samples 
and datasets of Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA), synthetic control method 
as well as falsification tests. 
1.2 Pollution and Infant Health: Evidence from the Oil Spill of the Gulf of Mexico 
In 2010, the Gulf Coast experienced the largest oil spill in the U.S. history.  Oil spill poses direct 
and indirect threats to human health. Direct threats from inhalation of evaporated crude oil 
chemicals and dermal contact with the oil and indirect threats via seafood safety (Rotkin-Ellman 
et al, 2012). Vulnerable groups such as pregnant women and infants are at higher risk of adverse 
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health impacts. This paper examines the impact of the oil spill of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico on 
air quality and infant health outcomes. The oil spill of 2010 is considered as an exogenous event 
that affected the coastal counties and parishes of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Texas. 
 Using a Difference in Difference methodology and US EPA AirData, we compare air quality 
(concentrations of NO2, PM10, SO2, and CO) of monitoring stations in Gulf of Mexico coastal 
counties after 2010 to air quality of monitoring stations in the Gulf of Mexico inland counties and 
non-Gulf states. Next, using Vital Statistics data from National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS) and a Difference in Difference methodology, we investigate the impact of the oil spill on 
infant health outcomes (incidence of low birth weight, incidence of premature, birth weight in 
grams and gestation in weeks). 
We find that the oil spill of 2010 decreases air quality in affected coastal counties, increases 
incidence of low birth weight (< 2500 gr) and incidence of premature born infants (< 37 weeks of 
gestation). Heterogeneity effects reveal more pronounced adverse infant health outcomes for black 
and Hispanic mothers, less educated mothers, unmarried, and younger mothers. The paper has 
important policy implications as vulnerable population are more affected by the oil spill. Our 
results point to avoidance measures that certain mothers can successfully apply against negative 
impacts of pollution. Results are robust to a wide range of controls, robustness checks, including 
placebo estimations. 
1.3 Party Affiliation and Public Spending: Evidence from U.S. Governors 
It is commonly believed that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to support social 
policies, increase government involvement, and spend a higher share of their budget on key sectors 
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such as education and health. Major cuts of Pennsylvania’s Republican governor in 2011 from 
higher education, Illinois’s Republican governor from health system in 2015, and Louisiana’s 
Republican governor from education in 2015 are some examples of higher association of 
Republicans and budget cuts to health and education sectors. However, literature is ambiguous 
regarding the impact of the party affiliation of governors (Democrat vs. Republican) on budgetary 
decisions. Inconsistent results are often due to small sample of years and failure to address the 
indigeneity issues. 
In this study exploiting gubernatorial election results from 1960 to 2012 and a Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD), we examine the impact of party affiliation of governors on total 
spending and on distributive budgetary decisions over key sectors (education, health/hospital, 
public safety, social welfare, and we combine the other sectors). We find significant gubernatorial 
partisan differences over allocation of money and no impact on total spending. Results show that 
Democratic governors spend higher share of budget on education, health/hospital, and public 
safety sectors (2.4, 4.9 and 3.8 % respectively). While, Republican governors spend more on other 
sectors (2.3%). Other sectors are combined as follows: highway, natural resources, park and 
recreation, interest on general debt, and governmental administration. We find no significant 
impact of political party of governors on total spending, only on the allocation of funds.  
The heterogeneity estimates show that southern states are not statistically different from non-
southern states. Both lame-duck and re-electable governors spend a higher share of the budget on 
education and health/hospital and less on other sectors. However, lame-duck Democratic 
governors spend significantly more on education and public safety and less on other sectors than 
re-electable Democratic governors. Dynamic of the spending shows similar impact of Democratic 
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governors within a term. Also there is no significant difference in the allocation of spending of 
Democratic governors when the president is a Democrat and when the Democrats control both 
houses. Results are robust to a wide range of controls and robustness tests including nonparametric 
and parametric estimations using different orders of polynomials (linear, quarter, cubic, and 
quartic), falsification checks, etc.   
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CHAPTER TWO: IMPACT OF PAID FAMILY LEAVE OF CALIFORNIA ON 
DELAYED CHILDBEARING AND ON INFANT HEALTH OUTCOMES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The occurrence of delayed childbearing is an increasing phenomenon. During the period between 
1970 and 2012, first births for women 35 years and older have increased for all races from 1.7 
percent to more than 10 percent (NCHS, 2014). Medical literature has well established that higher 
maternal age at first birth is associated with an increased risk of poor pregnancy outcomes. First 
births to women aged 35 and over have been associated with an increased likelihood of infertility, 
miscarriage, spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, medical risks, operative delivery, low birth weight, 
and pregnancy complications (Johonson and Tough, 2012; NCHS, 2014; Cnattingius et al., 1993; 
Guendelman et al., 2014). Changes in first birth trends toward older women also result in lower 
total fertility and family size, which have an important impact on the U.S. population structure in 
terms of size, composition, and future growth (Mathews and Hamilton, 2009).3 
Delayed childbearing has been increasing since the end of World War II following a tremendous 
increase in female labor force participation, improved educational and professional opportunities 
for women, and a decline in the wage gap concurrent with improved access to the effective 
contraceptive methods (Happel, Hill and Low, 1984; Kenya, 2009).4 Although higher female labor 
force participation has a significant impact on the U.S. economy, it makes it harder for families to 
                                                 
3 Average age of mothers at first births has increased by 3.6 years in the U.S. between 1970 and 2006 which provides 
evidence of delayed childbearing. At the same time, the first birth rate for women below the age of 30 has declined 
(NCHS, 2014). 
4 Labor force participation of women has increased from 33.9 percent in 1950 to more than 57 percent in 2014 (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics). 
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sustain a balance between work and family obligations (Fass, 2009). The U.S. is one of the four 
nations with the absence or limited work benefits in terms of paid family leave for pregnant women 
or mothers with newborn children. In 2004, California introduced a universal Paid Family Leave 
(PFL) policy which provides up to six weeks of paid maternity leave with 55 percent wage 
replacement to bond with a newborn child.5 
This paper investigates the impact of the PFL of California on the timing of first births. Using a 
Difference in Difference (DID) design, this study examines whether PFL of California has been 
successful in reducing maternal age at first birth by encouraging women to have their first child 
earlier. Results show that PFL policy causes a reduction in birth delay. Specifically, it reduces 2 
years in the timing of first birth for women over 35 years old and consequently this policy changes 
the age composition of new mothers toward younger ones. The negative causal impact of this 
policy on maternal age suggests an investigation into the impact of the PFL on infant health 
outcomes for women at delayed childbearing age. This paper presents evidence that this policy 
improves infant health outcomes by reducing incidence of low birth weight (<2500 g), premature 
(< 37 weeks of gestation), and cesarean-born infants. I also investigate the heterogeneity impact 
of the PFL policy by years of education, race, and marital status of new mothers. The literature 
shows that women, especially with higher age at first births, reveal more absenteeism from work 
and reduction in hours worked (Herr, 2008; Buckles 2008; Cristia 2008; Waldfogel, 1997; 
Waldfogel, 1998; Budig and England, 2001; Loughren and Zissimopolus, 2008; Anderson et al., 
2002). This paper also investigates the impact of the PFL of California on labor market outcomes 
                                                 
5 The only simple to satisfy eligibility criteria for PFL of California is payrolls in excess of 100 $ in a calendar quarter 
(State of California Employment Development Department).  
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including employment, weeks of work, and hours of work per week for women over 35 years old. 
Results show that this policy has encouraged a return to work by increasing the likelihood of 
employment after childbirth by 5 percent. Results are robust to a wide range of controls and 
robustness checks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses maternity leave in the U.S. and 
reviews the literature; Section 2.3 presents the methodology; Section 2.4 discusses the data and 
descriptive analysis; Section 2.5 presents the main results, heterogeneity, and sensitivity analysis; 
and Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.2 MATERNITY LEAVE IN THE U.S. AND RELATED LITERATURE 
2.2.1 Maternity Leave in the U.S. 
In 1993, the U.S. federal government introduced the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 
which provides 12 weeks unpaid but job protected leave from work.6 The main down side of 
FMLA is its restricted eligibility criteria, which made it far from universal accessibility. FMLA 
only covers certain private and local, state, and federal government employees who have worked 
for the same employer for at least 12 months prior to the start of the FMLA leave (with at least 
1250 hours). Also, the employee has to work for an employer with at least 50 employees within 
75 miles of the home.7 The other down side of the FMLA is unpaid leave, which resulted in the 
absence of income security for families and is one of the main reasons for not taking family leave 
                                                 
6 The purpose of the FMLA is providing time off work for certain workers in case of major life crisis and events such 
as taking care of seriously ill immediate family members including oneself or time off work for mothers to bond with 
a new born child. In terms of the eligibility, FMLA only covers 50 percent of the workers. But, take up rate is much 
lower between 20 to a maximum of 50 percent especially for women. 
7 Unites States Department of Labor. 
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(Unites States Department of Labor; State of California Employment Development Department; 
Fass, 2009). 
California is the first state to enact Paid Family Leave (PFL) on July 2004. PFL in California 
provides up to six weeks of partially paid family leave with 55 percent wage replacement of one’s 
weekly earnings up to a maximum benefit ($987 per week in 2011) to bond with a newborn child 
or to take care of a sick family member. Employees who are covered by the State Disability 
Insurance (SDI) are also covered by the PFL. Nearly all California workers are covered by the SDI 
program.8 Eligibility requirements for PFL are simple to satisfy. It does not require a minimum 
number of hours worked or limitation of firm size at which the employee is working. PFL 
eligibility requires an individual to be employed or actively looking for work at the time his or her 
family leave begins. The law requires coverage for employees working for employers with payrolls 
in excess of $100 in a calendar quarter. Both full-time and part-time workers can be eligible for 
PFL (State of California Employment Development Department). 
2.2.2 Related Literature   
Berkowitz et al. (1990) show that women aged 35 and older are at a higher risk of low birth weight 
and are significantly more likely to have both cesarean sections and infants who were admitted to 
the newborn intensive care unit. Also, older women have higher rates of complications during 
                                                 
8California, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York and Hawaii are the only states providing temporary disability 
insurance (TDI) for their workforce during the 1940s but it did not apply to pregnant women until the 1970s, with the 
passage of the pregnancy discrimination act. Usually, TDI related to pregnancy provides a specific percentage of wage 
replacement up to a maximum weekly dollar cap for a typical period of six weeks after the delivery of the baby. 
California’s PFL program is an extended version of the state’s TDI program (which is called SDI in California).  
California state disability insurance provides short run disability income replacement and is comprised of two separate 
wage replacement benefits including disability insurance and paid family leave. PFL does not provide job protection, 
although job retention rights can be covered using pre-existing laws including FMLA or the California Family Rights 
Act (CFRA). 
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pregnancy and delivery (Johnson and Tough, 2012; Heffner et al., 2003; Baghurst et al., 2014). 
Johnson et al. (2012) find that the medical risks of childbearing including multiple births, preterm 
delivery, stillbirths, and caesarean section increase with maternal age. The latter has been 
supported in the Heffner, et al. (2003) study, that women with first births over 35 years old are at 
a higher risk of cesarean delivery. 
Maternity leave policy is suggested as one possible family-friendly solution to address the 
challenges faced by working mothers and their newborn children. Previous literature has 
investigated the impact of maternity leave on both labor market outcomes and infant health 
outcomes. Ruhm (2000) notes that paid leave reduces infant fatalities and low birth weight in 
European countries. Also, he suggests that parental leave may be a cost effective method by 
bettering child health. Baker and Milligan (2005) show that maternity leave in Canada decreases 
the proportion of women quitting their jobs, increases leave taking, and increases the proportion 
returning to their pre-birth employers. Although, they find no impact of maternity leave on infant 
health including low birth weight or infant mortality. In another study, Baker and Milligan (2008) 
support that maternity leave mandates in Canada have been associated with a high likelihood of 
leave taking and a positive impact on critical breastfeeding duration. The latter also has been 
highlighted in the study of Huang and Yang (2014) that PFL of California has been accompanied 
by a higher percentage in both exclusive and inclusive breastfeeding. Rossin (2011), using vital 
statistics data, finds that the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in the United States 
improves infant health outcomes in terms of birth weight and a decrease in likelihood of a 
premature birth.  
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In terms of impact of maternity leave on mothers’ labor market outcomes, Waldfogel (1999) shows 
that FMLA increases leave usage. However, it has no significant negative effects on women’s 
employment or wages. Baum (2003) shows that FMLA has a small and statistically insignificant 
effect on employment and wages as FMLA maternity leave is short and unpaid. However, 
Lawrence et al. (2003) show that those in jobs that provided leave coverage under FMLA are more 
likely to take leave, but return more quickly after the exhaustion of leave. Espinola-Arredondo and 
Mondel (2010) find a significantly positive effect of FMLA on female employment and a 
significantly positive effect on the change in female employment for some of the states that 
expanded the benefits and eligibility criteria of FMLA.  
Baum and Ruhm (2013), using the March Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1999 to 
2010 and a Difference in Difference (DID) approach, show that California PFL raised leave-taking 
by around 2.4 weeks for the average mother. The rights to paid leave are also associated with 
higher work and employment probabilities for mothers nine to twelve months after birth, possibly 
by improving labor force attachment. They also find positive effects of California’s program on 
hours and weeks of work during their child’s second year of life and possibly also on wages. 
Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) using CPS data and a DID methodology also show that the California 
program doubled the overall use of maternity leave and increased the usual weekly work hours of 
employed mothers of 1 to 3 years old children. Dustmann and Schönberg (2008), show that 
maternity leave expansions in Germany increase return to work after childbirth. In another study, 
Schonberg and Ludsteck (2014) show that maternity leave expansions in Germany reduce 
mothers’ post birth employment rates in the short run. However, the long run effects of the 
expansions on mothers’ post birth labor market outcomes are small.  
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The literature has emphasized the importance of maternity leave on infant health outcomes and 
labor market outcomes for women. However, the impact of this policy on birth delay has not been 
investigated yet. Delayed childbearing traditionally has been defined as pregnancy to women aged 
over 35 years and is the focus of this study. This paper contributes to the literature by examining 
the impact of the PFL policy on the timing of first births and age composition of women at first 
births. In particular, I examine whether PFL of California was successful in reducing birth delay 
by decreasing maternal age at first birth. This paper also looks into the impact of this policy on 
infant health especially for women over 35 years who are at higher risk of poor pregnancy 
outcomes. This is important because births to older women have a high social cost in terms of 
infant and mother health outcomes (Johnson and Tough, 2012; Heffner et al., 2003; Baghurst et 
al., 2014; Berkowitz et al., 1990). A further contribution is to examine the impact of this policy on 
employment, weeks of work, and hours of work per week for this targeted group after first 
childbirth.9  
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
I use a Difference in Difference (DID) methodology to investigate the impact of the PFL of 
California on different outcome variables including age of mother at first birth, infant health 
outcomes, and labor market outcomes of women after first childbirth. The main estimation for the 
impact of the PFL of California on the age of mother at first birth is: 
                                                 
9 Literature shows that women, especially with higher age at first births, reveal more absenteeism from work and 
reduction in hours worked (Herr, 2008). 
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𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑠 +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2004𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑠 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2004𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡𝛽5 +  𝑆𝑠𝛽6 +
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝛽7 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡        (2.1)           
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents the outcome variable which is the age of mother 𝑖 at state 𝑠 and year 𝑡 at first birth. 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑠 is the dummy variable which takes a value of one if mother lives in California and zero 
otherwise. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2004𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable representing the enactment of the PFL at time 𝑡. It 
takes a value of one for the years post 2004 when the FPL got effective and takes value of zero for 
the years prior to 2004.  𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑠 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2004𝑖𝑡 is the interaction term identifying the treatment group 
for whether state 𝑠 enacted the PFL in year 2004. The treatment group is mothers in California 
after the year 2004. Accordingly, 𝛽3 is the coefficient of interest, which captures the impact of this 
policy on the women’s decision regarding timing of their first births. Negative values of 𝛽3 indicate 
that PFL of California encourages women to have their first child earlier and positive values of 
this coefficient show this policy encourages women to delay first birth timing.  
My sample is limited to the new mothers between the ages of 20 to 45 years old having their first 
live birth.10 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of individual characteristics of women including: race, education, 
marital status, 5 years interval age groups, mother’s birth year and household income.11 I control 
for the mother’s birth year using dummy variables for each 10 years’ interval to control for 
                                                 
10 PFL eligibility requires an individual to be employed or actively looking for work at the time his or her family leave 
begins. I check the robustness of my results to this condition by using IPUMS-USA data set. IPUMS-USA contains 
information on whether the mother has worked last year. I restrict my sample to women 20 to 45 years old with an 
eldest child less than one year old who have worked any usual hours last year (during their pregnancy). Result are 
similar. I restrict my sample to women with the eldest child less than one year old for three reasons. First, it enables 
me to check whether an individual has worked any usual hours last year which is during pregnancy in order to be 
potentially eligible of receiving PFL. Second, limiting the sample to mothers experiencing their first birth reduces 
potential heterogeneity effects among mothers. Third, for these women the childbearing decision is more strategic as 
this is the first birth for the mother. 
11 I control for the age of mother using dummy variables for each five years intervals including 20 to 25, 26 to 30, 31 
to 35, 36 to 40, and 41 to 45. 
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women’s cohort differences.12 𝑇𝑡 is the year fixed effect and represents common shocks to all 
women in a particular year. 𝑆𝑠 is the state fixed effect which controls differences in the women’s 
decision for the timing of first birth due to the state specific effects. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 represents a vector of 
linear and quadratic state-specific time trends that account for time-series variation within each 
state. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The estimation strategy for other outcome 
variables for infant health outcomes of new mothers including gestation in weeks, premature (< 
37 weeks of gestation), birth weight (g), low birth weight (<2500 g), and C-section method of 
delivery are similar to the estimation strategy of the timing of first births in equation (2.1). In the 
estimation of infant health outcomes, I also control for other risk factors of pregnancy such as 
plurality (multiple births vs. single birth), place of birth (in hospital vs. not in hospital), number of 
prenatal visits (=1 if mother had minimum of 4 prenatal visits), and sex of infant (=1 if infant is 
male). The estimation strategy for labor market outcomes of new mothers after first births 
including employment, weeks, and hours of work per week is similar to the estimation strategy of 
the timing of first births in equation (2.1).13 
I also estimate the heterogeneity of the impact of the PFL of California by individual characteristics 
including race (white, black, and Hispanic), age groups (over 35 years old and under 35 years old), 
educational attainment (college graduate, some college, high school, and less than high school), 
                                                 
12 The youngest mother in my sample was born in 1993 and the eldest mother was born in 1955. Birth year intervals 
are: 1955 to 1965, 1966 to 1975, 1975 to 1985, and 1986 to 1993. 
13 The NCHS data set does not provide labor market outcomes of mothers. In order to investigate the impact of the 
PFL of California on labor market outcomes including employment, weeks, and hours of work per week I use 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA). This data set provides all the control variables in the main 
estimation (equation 2.1) including: race, education, marital status, 5 years interval age groups, mother’s birth year as 
well as household income.  
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and marital status (married, and unmarried). 𝛽4 is the additional difference in the timing of first 
births by binary individual characteristics at time 𝑡.  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑠 +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2004𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2004𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑠 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2004𝑖𝑡           (2.2)
× 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                           
Studying maternal age is more crucial for women with delayed first births to ages over 35 years. 
Pregnant women aged over 35 years are at a higher risk of infants with low birth weight (<2500 
g), premature births (<37 gestations weeks), and complications of pregnancy and delivery 
(Cnattingius et al., 2004; Heffner, et al. 2003; Gertru S. Berkowitz, et al., 1990). In this regard, 
this study mainly investigates whether PFL of California has any causal impact on the timing of 
first births and consequently infant health outcomes for women at delayed childbearing (over 35 
years old).  
2.4 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
2.4.1 Data 
I use two data sets in this study: National Vital Statistics data from National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS) and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA) from 2000 to 2010.  
Vital Statistics from NCHS provides birth data of all the births registered in the 50 U.S. states. I 
used this data set to investigate the impact of the PFL of California on the timing of first births for 
new mothers and infant health outcomes including incidence of premature (< 37 weeks of 
gestation), low birth weight (<2500 g), and cesarean-born infants as well as gestation in weeks and 
birth weight. This data set enables to control for the age, years of education, race, marital status, 
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and other risk factors of the pregnancy including plurality, place of the birth, prenatal visits, and 
sex of the infant. 
IPUMS – USA provides a large sample size of mothers with individual characteristics such as age, 
years of education, race, and marital status. This data set also provides two variables regarding the 
age of the eldest and youngest child of the mothers. My sample is limited to the mothers with an 
eldest child less than one year old who have worked any usual hours in previous year (during 
pregnancy). I also use this data set to investigate the robustness of the results to an alternate data 
set. This data set provides information regarding the labor market outcomes of the mothers such 
as employment, weeks, and hours of work per week which enables the study of the impact of the 
PFL of California on the labor market outcomes of mothers after their first birth. 
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for selected variables in the National Vital Statistics Data, 
for the whole sample and split according to the age of mother at first births in two groups of less 
than 35 and over 35 years old. In the whole sample there are 11,574,452 mothers with first live 
births at average age of 26.9 years. 11% of first born infants of all mothers aged 20 to 45 years old 
during 2000 to 2010 are considered premature (<37 gestations weeks), 8% low birth weight (<2500 
g), and 30% delivered using the C-section method of delivery.  
There are 816,316 mothers over 35 years old with first live births in the sample. These mothers 
have poorer infant health outcomes with 15% premature, 12% low birth weight, and 48% born 
using the C-section method of delivery, compared to mothers less than 35 years old (10% 
premature, 8% low birth weight, and 29% born using C-section method of delivery). Worse infant 
health outcomes for women over 35 years old highlights the importance of investigating any policy 
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impacting the timing of first birth decision for women. Mothers over 35 are more likely to be 
married and have more years of education. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics          
 All  Less than 35 years old  Over 35 years old 
Outcome variables  n mean sd  n mean sd  n mean sd 
Age of mother at first birth 11,574,452 26.89431 5.208593  10,758,136 26.04318 4.312077  816,316 38.11127 2.061458 
Premature (<37 weeks of gestation) 11,574,452 0.110192 0.313129  10,758,136 0.107005 0.30912  816,316 0.152189 0.359204 
Gestation in weeks 11,574,452 38.79537 2.572117  10,758,136 38.82785 2.551269  816,316 38.36685 2.79777 
LBW (<2500 g) 11,574,452 0.081655 0.273839  10,758,136 0.078845 0.269497  816,316 0.118687 0.32342 
LBW (<1500 g) 11,574,452 0.015864 0.124949  10,758,136 0.0152 0.122348  816,316 0.024613 0.154943 
BW (gr) 11,574,452 3261.968 596.7469  10,758,136 3266.735 591.0173  816,316 3199.131 664.5053 
C-section 11,574,452 0.304788 0.460318  10,758,136 0.291601 0.4545  816,316 0.479537 0.499582 
Control variables            
Mom has college 11,574,452 0.299022 0.45783  10,758,136 0.285352 0.451582  816,316 0.479181 0.499567 
Mom has some college 11,574,452 0.188817 0.391364  10,758,136 0.192662 0.39439  816,316 0.138152 0.34506 
Mom has high school or less 11,574,452 0.277197 0.447614  10,758,136 0.287219 0.452465  816,316 0.145115 0.352217 
Mom is white 11,574,452 0.627884 0.483369  10,758,136 0.623347 0.484547  816,316 0.68768 0.46344 
Mon is black 11,574,452 0.111112 0.314271  10,758,136 0.113056 0.316661  816,316 0.085489 0.279608 
Mon is Hispanic 11,574,452 0.18 0.384187  10,758,136 0.184808 0.388142  816,316 0.116623 0.32097 
Mom is married 11,574,452 0.663025 0.472676  10,758,136 0.650455 0.476826  816,316 0.82868 0.376788 
Mom is Unmarried 11,574,452 0.336975 0.472676  10,758,136 0.349545 0.476826  816,316 0.17132 0.376788 
Mom is 20-25 yrs old 11,574,452 0.358956 0.479694  10,758,136 0.386193 0.486876  - - - 
Mom is 26-30 yrs old 11,574,452 0.303946 0.459959  10,758,136 0.327009 0.46912  - - - 
Mom is 31-35 yrs old 11,574,452 0.172163 0.377522  10,758,136 0.185227 0.388481  - - - 
Mom is 36-40 yrs old 11,574,452 0.060748 0.238868  - - -  816,316 0.861344 0.345587 
Mom is 41-45 yrs old 11,574,452 0.009779 0.098404  - - -  816,316 0.138656 0.345587 
Mom had less than 4 Prenatal visit 11,574,452 0.061866 0.240912  10,758,136 0.062845 0.242684  816,316 0.048958 0.21578 
Mom not give Birth at hospital 11,574,452 0.007207 0.084589  10,758,136 0.007249 0.084831  816,316 0.006658 0.081324 
Multiple Births 11,574,452 0.021136 0.143836  10,758,136 0.018906 0.136194  816,316 0.050516 0.219007 
Infant is male 11,574,452 0.512661 0.49984  10,758,136 0.512682 0.499839  816,316 0.512383 0.499847 
Note: Sample includes mothers with first live births aged 20 to 45 years, less than 35, and over 35 years old. Year 2004 and SDI states are dropped. 
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA).
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2.4.3 Graphical Evidence 
 
Figure 2.1 presents the birth rates for women at different age groups during 1990 to 2013, which 
provides a useful measure for interpreting childbearing patterns. It represents an increasing birth 
trend for older women, especially for age groups of 35 to 39 and 40 to 44, and a decreasing birth 
trend for younger women at age groups of 20 to 24 and 25 to 29, as well as a sharp decrease for 
women less than 20 years old.   
 
Figure 2.1: Birth rates by selected age groups of mothers (Rates are plotted on a logarithmic scale). 
Source: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System. 
 
Appendix A Figure A.1 presents a summary of the main findings using comparison of California 
and a synthetic control group. Appendix A Figure A.1 shows that implementation of the PFL 
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policy changes the composition of the women with first births by increasing the fraction of births 
for women aged 30 to 34 and decreasing proportion of births for women aged 40 to 44. There are 
no change for the age groups of 20 to 29 and 35 to 39. Absence of changes for the age group of 35 
to 39 can be justified through a counterbalance of decrease for the age groups of 40 to 45 and 35 
to 39. Figure 2.2 illustrates that PFL policy reduces birth delay by changing the age composition 
of women with first births toward younger ones.  
2.5 RESULTS 
2.5.1 Main Results 
Table 2.2 presents coefficients from the estimation of the main equation (2.1) for the age of mother 
at first birth using different specifications. Column (1) presents result without controls and column 
(2) with controls. Results are robust to the inclusion of the individual control variables, which is a 
sign of an unbiased estimate.14 Column (3) presents the result after excluding the states with 
Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) from the sample. Finally, column (4) shows the estimated 
coefficient using synthetic control states.15 Results are similar across these four columns and show 
that PFL of California decreases the age at first birth equivalent to .06 years (≅ 1 month).16 
Table 2.3 presents results when the dependent variable measures age at first births for women at 
either delayed (over 35 years old) or normal (between 20 to 35 years old) childbearing age. 
                                                 
14 Results are also robust to the smaller time frame of 2000 to 2008. 
15 There are 4 TDI states, including Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York and Hawaii. Synthetic control states are all 
states except Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. 
16 A key assumption in the DID analysis is that the underlying trends of the treatment and control groups being 
considered are similar. I include state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends in the DID specifications to 
partially address this issue. I also address this issue by using the synthetic control method and a series of robustness 
checks. 
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Interestingly, the impact of the PFL of California on the timing of first births for women less than 
35 years old is small and not significant (.01 year equivalent to .12 months). However, women 
with first births delayed to ages over 35 years respond significantly to this policy by reducing the 
timing of their first births by two years. This result shows that maternity leave policies are effective 
in reducing birth delay.  
Table 2.2: DID Estimates for Age of Mother at First Birth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CA*Post 2004 -0.0501** -0.0655*** -0.0637*** -0.0644** 
 (0.0202) (0.0208) (0.0225) (0.0240) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 27.5589 27.5589 27.5589 27.5589 
     
Individual Controls n y y y 
No TDI states n n y y 
Synthetic Control n n n y 
Time and State FE y y y y 
State time trends y y y y 
Note: Outcome variable is age of mother at first birth. Year 2004 is dropped from the sample 
as the PFL of California was enacted in July 2004. Column one, shows estimate without 
including individual characteristics. There are 12602784 number of observations. In column 
two, I include individual control (race, years of education, marital status, age groups, and 
mother’s birth year) variables. In column three, I have dropped states with Temporary 
Disability Insurance (TDI) including; Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York and Hawaii with 
11574452 number of observations. Finally, column 4 presents result using synthetic control 
states. All regressions include time and state fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors 
are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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Table 2.3: DID Estimates for Age of Mother at First Birth (Women <35 and >35 years old) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All <35 years old >35 years old 
CA*Post 2004 -0.0637*** -0.0143 -2.0319*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0132) (0.2227) 
    
Pre-Treatment Mean 27.5589 26.4495 38.2108 
Note: Outcome variable is age of mother at first birth. Year 2004 and TDI states are dropped. 
Also, sample is limited to mothers with the first live births. Column 1 shows estimate for all 
women, column 2 for women less than 35 years old and column 3 for women over 35 years old. 
Number of observations is 11574452 mothers with first live births. All estimates include 
individual control variables. All regressions include time and state fix effects and State time 
trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
Appendix A, Table A.1 shows the results for the proportion of women with first live births at 
different 5 years interval age groups when aggregating data at the county level. It shows that 
implementation of the PFL policy causes reduction of 5 and 12 percent in the proportion of first 
time mothers for 35-39 and 40-44 age groups respectively, whereas the fraction of new mothers 
for 30-34 age group increased by 7 percent. It provides evidence of a hastening in the timing of 
first births through the change in the age composition of women with first births toward younger 
ones. There is no statistically significant impact on the fraction of women less than 30 years old.  
Table 2.4 presents results when the dependent variable measures infant health outcomes including 
incidence of premature (<37 weeks of gestation), low birth weight (<2500 g), extremely low birth 
weight (<1500g), and cesarean-born infants as well as gestation in weeks and birth weight. Results 
show that the PFL policy only improves infant health outcomes of women over 35 years old by 
reducing 1.5 percent in the likelihood of premature born infant, 1 and .5 percent in the incidence 
of low birth weight, and extremely low birth weight respectively, and 3 percent in infants born 
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using the C-section method of delivery. Also, this policy was successful in causing a 1 percent 
increase in birth weight.17  
Table 2.4: DID Estimates for Infant Health Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All <35 years old >35 years old 
Premature -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0155*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.0877 0.0845 0.1183 
    
Gestation in weeks 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 39.0511 39.0876 38.7030 
    
LBW (<2500 g) -0.0020* -0.0009 -0.0114*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.0677 0.0643 0.0999 
    
LBW (<1500 g) -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0047*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.0124 0.01179 0.0192 
    
BW 0.0048 0.0037 0.0145*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 3303.778 3309.048 3253.171 
    
C-section 0.0008 0.0044* -0.0314*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0032) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.2787 0.2616 0.4420 
Note: Outcome variables are premature (<37 weeks of gestation), gestation in weeks, low birth weight 
(<2500 g), extreme low birth weight (<1500 g), birth weight (gr), and C-section method of delivery 
for all mothers aged 20 to 45, mothers over 35 years old, and mothers less than 35 years old. Number 
of observations is 11574452 mothers with first live births. Year 2004 and TDI states are dropped. Also, 
sample is limited to mothers with the first live birth. All estimates include individual control variables. 
All regressions include time and state fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
                                                 
17 One possible reason for these improvements is effectiveness of PFL of California in reducing age at first births. 
Cnattingius et al. (1992) show that women over 35 years reveal significantly higher odds ratios of fetal deaths, low 
birth weight, and premature births. In another study, Cnattingius et al. (1993) find that rates of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes are substantially higher in first than second births. Guendelman et al. (2014) also find that maternity leave 
in late pregnancy shows promise for reducing cesarean deliveries in working women. 
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Table 2.5 presents results for the labor market outcomes, including employment, weeks and hours 
of work per week for college graduated mothers over 35 years following their first childbirth.18 I 
focus on this group of women, because the related literature presents that one salient change after 
childbirth for college educated women is an increase in the likelihood of absenteeism and exit from 
labor force which induce general and firm-specific skills depreciation and consequently wage 
reduction (Buckles, 2008; Cristia, 2008; Waldfogel, 1997; Waldfogel, 1998; Budig and England, 
2001; Loughren and Zissimopolus, 2008; Anderson et al. 2002). Not only does PFL of California 
decrease birth delay for college graduated women over 35 years old (presented in Table 2.6), but 
it also improves labor market attachment by increasing the likelihood of employment after 
childbirth. Conditional on working, Table 2.5 shows that PFL reduces the weeks of work after 
childbirth until one year. Part of this decrease is because of an increase in leave taking, which has 
been well documented in the related literature (e.g. Berger and Waldfogel, 2003; Baum and Ruhm, 
2013; Rossin et al, 2013; Espinola-Arredondo and Mondel, 2010). College educated women over 
35 years old who are more likely to exit from the labor force, under PFL policy prefer to stay in 
the labor market but work fewer weeks (10%) until one year after childbirth. This result is 
important, because it shows that the California maternity leave policy reduces the speed of human 
capital depreciation of these mothers after childbirth by increasing their attachment to the labor 
force. However, Table 2.5 shows that there is no impact on the labor market outcomes in a longer 
time period of two years after childbirth.  
 
                                                 
18 The limitation of this part of the study is the inability to see if women with eldest child of two years old had worked 
any usual hours during pregnancy. In table A.3, I show that results for age of mother at first birth for different 
specifications are robust to removing this condition. 
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Table 2.5: DID Estimates for Labor Market Outcomes for Women Over 35 with College Degree 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Employed Weeks worked Hours worked 
A. Mothers with babies of 1 month to 5 years old 
 CA*Post 2004 0.0559*** 0.0424 0.00401 
  (0.00423) (0.0271) (0.00758) 
 Pre-Treatment Mean 0.7090 43.2181 35.2017 
B. Mothers with babies of less than 1 year old 
 CA*Post 2004 0.0259** -0.0994*** 0.0135 
  (0.0107) (0.0268) (0.00989) 
 Pre-Treatment Mean 0.74251 42.7983 37.0967 
C. Mothers with babies of 1 year old 
 CA*Post 2004 0.0962*** 0.0473 -0.00837 
  (0.00750) (0.0346) (0.0129) 
 Pre-Treatment Mean 0.7518 43.3098 35.0925 
D. Mothers with babies of 2 years old 
 CA*Post 2004 0.0151 -0.0194 -0.0135 
  (0.00980 (0.0280) (0.0144) 
 Pre-Treatment Mean 0.7039 43.3699 35.9242 
Note: Outcome variables are employment, logarithm of hours and weeks worked conditional 
on employment for mothers over 35 years old who have college degree. Year 2004 and TDI 
states are dropped. Panel A presents labor market outcomes of mothers with eldest child one 
month to 5 years old who have been eligible for PFL. Panels B, C, and D show the dynamic of 
labor market outcomes for mothers with babies less than one year old, one year old, and two 
years old who have been eligible for receiving PFL. All regressions include individual control 
variables, time and state fixed effects and State time trends. Number of employed women in 
panels A, B, C, and D are 719913, 100539, 116240, and 124975 respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA). 
2.5.2 Heterogeneity and Robustness 
Table 2.6 shows the heterogeneity of the impact of the PFL policy of California on the timing of 
first births for all women (aged 20 to 45 years) and women over 35 by years of education, race, 
and marital status. Panel A of Table 2.6 shows a slight higher impact of the PFL policy in reducing 
age at first birth for college educated, black, and married women aged 20 to 45 years. Panel B of 
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Table 2.6 indicates that college educated women over the age of 35 show a higher response to PFL 
policy by reducing 2.5 years in timing of their first births compared to women with some college 
(1.3 years) and high school or less than high school (1.1 years). This suggests that the decrease in 
birth delay under the PFL policy of California is highly driven by the change in the timing of first 
births for college educated women. Wilde et al. (2010) and Anderson et al. (2002) show that high-
skilled women experience the largest motherhood penalties with a sharper wage diverge which 
tends to persist over time for exiting the labor force to care for their children. In comparison, low-
skilled workers are less vulnerable to such earnings erosion, since they have less human capital 
and will escape a motherhood wage penalty.19 These differential costs of childbearing account for 
the far greater tendency of high-skilled women to delay or avoid childbearing altogether (Buckles, 
2008). However, results show that providing maternity leave such as the generous PFL of 
California encourages college educated women to hasten their decision to have their first child. 
Table 2.6 also shows that white women compared to black and Hispanic women, and married 
women in comparison to unmarried women show higher responses to this policy by reducing 
respectively 1.9 and 2.1 years in timing of their first births. Other heterogeneities regarding infant 
health outcomes of women over 35 years old including incidence of premature (<37 weeks of 
gestation), low birth weight (<2500 g and <1500 g), and cesarean-born infants as well as gestation 
and birth weight by education, race, and marital status of mothers are shown in Table A.2. 
                                                 
19 Miller (2008) and Herr (2007) note that motherhood delay leads to a substantial increase in earning, wages and work 
hours per year delay. Supporting a human capital story, the advantage is largest for the college-educated women and 
those in professional and managerial occupations. 
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Table 2.6: DID Estimates for Heterogeneity of all Women and Women Over 35 Years Old 
Note: Outcome variable is age of mother at first birth for all women aged 20 to 45 years old. Year 2004 and TDI states are dropped. Also, sample 
is limited to mothers with first live births. Number of observations is 11,574,452 mothers with first live births. All estimates include individual 
control variables. All regressions include time and state fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 Education  Race  Marital Status 
 College Some 
College 
High 
School & 
less 
  White Black Hispanic  Married Unmarried 
Panel A            
CA*Post 2004 (all) -.1594*** -0.0511*** -0.0708***   -0.0624** -0.1243*** -0.0561*  -0.1132*** 0.0469 
 (0.0375) (0.0161) (0.0197)   (0.0240) (0.0287) (0.0311)  (0.0217) (0.0285) 
            
Pre-Treatment Mean 30.9347 26.8310 25.0468   29.1126 26.0681 25.3566  28.7249 24.6904 
Panel B            
CA*Post 2004 -2.5082*** -1.2995*** -1.1481***   -1.8949*** -1.4533*** -1.4895***  -2.1359*** -1.0612*** 
(+35 years old) (0.1360) (0.0763) (0.0858)   (0.0919) (0.0903) (0.0808)  (0.1719) (0.0858) 
            
Pre-Treatment Mean 38.2192 38.2218 38.1565   38.2838 38.3229 38.0770  38.1648 38.4626 
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Appendix A, Table A.2 shows that PFL increases gestation in weeks and birth weight of black 
infants more that white and Hispanic infants. This is important because there is a big gap between 
rates of premature births among mothers from different racial groups. The National Center for 
Health Statistics (2014) reports that non-Hispanic black infants are about 50 percent more likely to 
be born premature than non-Hispanic white, and Hispanic infants. Risk of low birth weight among 
non-Hispanic black infants is also more than twice that of non-Hispanic white and Hispanic infants 
(NCHS, 2005). The higher impact of this policy on black infants helps to reduce the existing racial 
gap in gestation and birth weight of infants.20 
Appendix A, Table A.3 shows the robustness of the results to using different samples and datasets. 
Using the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA) data set, I check the robustness 
of the impact of the PFL of California on the timing of first births. PFL eligibility criteria requires 
women to have worked any usual hours during previous year (during pregnancy) to be qualified for 
receiving PFL benefits. The first row of Table A.3 shows the results for mothers with eldest child 
less than one year old who have worked any usual hours during the previous year. The second row 
of Appendix A, Table A.3 shows the results without limiting the sample to mothers with working 
any usual hours during previous year. Results from both samples are the same and verify the main 
estimates. 
Appendix A, Table A.4 presents the results using IPUMS-USA data set and sample of mothers with 
youngest child less than one year old who have worked any usual hours during previous year. This 
sample includes mothers with eldest child less than one year old and also mothers with more than 
                                                 
20 Higher educated women and white women also show higher response to PFL by reducing delivery using C-section 
method. 
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one child but with youngest child less than one year old. In order to avoid high potential 
heterogeneity among larger families, I limit this sample to mothers with at most three children. I 
also include a control variable for number of children.21 Table A.4 also verifies the robustness of 
the main results. 
Appendix A, Table A.5 presents robustness tests for differential time trends in the DID analysis. I 
checked for the placebo interactions between indicators of years 2001, 2002, 2006, and 2007 and 
an indicator for treatment state into the DID model. If there are any differential time trends between 
treatment and control states, then we may see spurious effects in the years prior or after the PFL 
enactment of California. Appendix A, Table A.5, presents the results for this specification check 
for women over 35 years old as this is the sample for which I find the strongest impact. Results 
suggest that for most of the cases there is no spurious effect prior or after the enactment of PFL, 
which strengthens the validity of the findings for age of mother at first births and other outcome 
variables including; infant health outcomes and employment. Appendix A, Table A.6 presents the 
robustness check using synthetic control states as the control group. Results shows, once again, that 
PFL of California has a significant causal effect on women over 35 years old by reducing the timing 
of first births, improving infant health outcomes, and finally increasing likelihood of attachment to 
the labor force.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the impact of the Paid Family Leave (PFL) of California on the timing of 
first births and infant health outcomes. During the period of 1970 and 2012, the first births for 
                                                 
21 Results are robust not limiting the sample by number of children. 
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women 35 years and older have increased for all races from 1.7 percent to more than 10 percent 
(NCHS, 2014). This paper provides evidence that PFL policy causes a reduction in the birth delay. 
This reduction happens through the change in the age composition of women with first births toward 
younger ones. Specifically, women over 35 years old respond significantly to the PFL policy by 
reducing 2 years in the timing of their first births. The occurrence of delayed childbearing is an 
increasing phenomenon and has been associated with an increased risk of poor pregnancy outcomes 
(Cnattingius et al., 1992; Cnattingius et al., 1993). Using a Difference in Difference (DID) 
methodology and Vital Statistics data from National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), this paper 
also shows that PFL improves infant health outcomes of women at delayed childbearing by 
reducing incidence of low birth weight (<2500 g), premature (<37 weeks of gestation), and 
cesarean-born infants by 1.5%, 1.1%, and 3.1% respectively. The literature shows that women, 
especially with higher age at first birth, reveal more absenteeism from work and reduction in hours 
worked (Herr, 2008). I investigate the impact of this policy on labor market outcomes of new 
mothers. Results show that this policy has encouraged a return to work with a 5% increase in the 
likelihood of employment after childbirth for women over 35 years old. This result is important, 
because it shows that PFL policy reduces the speed of human capital depreciation of these women 
by increasing their attachment to the labor force after childbirth. The results are robust to a wide 
range of controls and robustness checks.  
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CHAPTER THREE: POLLUTION AND INFANT HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM THE OIL 
SPILL OF THE GULF OF MEXICO 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Gulf Coast experienced the largest oil spill in U.S. history. With an estimated release 
of about 5 million barrels of oil over nearly three months, the Deepwater Horizon Spill was almost 
50 times larger than the second biggest spill in U.S. history, the 1969 Santa Barbara spill. The oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico poses direct threats to human health from inhalation or dermal contact 
with the oil and dispersant chemicals, and indirect threats via seafood safety (Rotkin-Ellman et al, 
2012). The oil spill of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico is considered an exogenous event that affected 
the coastal counties in the Gulf region. Coastal counties and parishes of Alabama, Florida, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas have been negatively affected by the oil spill. 
Pregnant women and infants can be at higher risk of adverse health impacts of the oil spill. Using 
air quality data from the US Environmental Protection Agency, infant health data from the National 
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) dataset and a Difference in Difference methodology, this study 
aims to investigate the impact of the oil spill on air quality and on infant health outcomes. We 
compare air quality in monitoring stations close to the oil spill to other air monitoring stations and 
infant health outcomes of mothers in coastal counties in the Gulf of Mexico after 2010 to mothers 
in inland counties and non-Gulf of Mexico counties. This paper aims to investigate the causal 
impact of the oil spill on air quality (NO2, PM10, SO2, and C0) and on health outcomes of infants 
(birth weight, low birth weight incidence, gestation in weeks and premature newborn incidence). 
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Those health outcomes have been documented as good measures of infant health and are important 
predictors of outcomes during childhood (e.g. Figlio et al., 2014) and adulthood (e.g. Black et al., 
2007). 
We find that the oil spill of 2010 decreases the air quality and increases incidence of low birth 
weight (below 2500 gr) and premature born infants (below 37 weeks of gestation). Heterogeneity 
effects reveal more pronounced adverse infant health outcomes for black mothers, less educated 
mothers, unmarried, and mothers less than 20 years old. The paper has important policy 
implications as certain mothers are more affected by the oil spill. Our results point to avoidance 
measures that certain mothers can successfully apply against negative impacts of pollution. Our 
results are robust to a wide range of controls and robustness checks, including placebo estimations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the literature; Section 3.3 
discusses the oil spill, data and descriptive analysis; Section 3.4 presents the methodology; Section 
3.5 presents the results and section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The paper joins a growing body of literature that documents negative impacts of pollution on health 
and economic outcomes.22 Recent papers document the negative impact of pollution on infant 
health outcomes in the U.S. By example, Currie et al (2013) find negative impact for water 
contamination and Currie (2009A, 2009B) for air quality. Research in several countries also provide 
evidence of adverse impact of the air pollution on infant health outcomes; in Mexico (Arceo-Gomez 
                                                 
22 The literature of pollution on health and economic outcomes is vast. Zivin and Neidell (2013) offer a good survey of 
the literature. 
34 
 
 
et al., 2012; Foster et al, 2009), India (Greenstone and Hanna, 2011; Brainerd and Menon, 2012), 
and United Kingdom (Janke et al., 2009). 
Certain papers have also documented the negative impacts of oil on pollution and health. Burning 
oil has been shown to generate particulate matter, which is associated with cardiac and respiratory 
symptoms and premature mortality (Solomon and Janssen, 2010; Rotkin-Ellman, Wong, Solomon, 
2011; D'Andrea & Reddy, 2014). Lavaine and Neidell (2013) find that temporary reduction in oil 
refineries, due to a strike, leads to a significant reduction in sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentrations 
and increases in birth weight and gestational age of newborns, particularly for those exposed to the 
strike during the third trimester of pregnancy. DNA damage also has been documented in the 
prestige oil spill of 2002 in Spain (Laffon et al, 2006). Other papers have argued that adverse impact 
of pollution on human health calls for avoidance activities to reduce negative impacts of pollution. 
Some optimizing individuals may compensate for increases in pollution by reducing their exposure. 
Zivin et al (2011), by example, find that following water contaminations, there is an increase in 
bottled water sales (see also Moretti and Neidell, 2011 and Janke (2014)). 
Prenatal exposure to pollution has also been found to have long term impacts. Figlio et al. (2014) 
study the relation between birth weight and cognitive development. They find that the effects of 
infant health on cognitive development are important and constant through the school career. They 
find that the effect is invariant to school quality and similar across different family background. 
Black et al. (2007), using twins data from Norway, find that birth weight is an important predictor 
of both short term and long run outcomes. In particular, they find that low birth weight negatively 
affects educational attainment and earnings. Persico et al. (2016) and Aizer and Currie (2015) have 
found that prenatal exposure to environmental toxicants reduce later developmental outcomes of 
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children by reducing test scores and increasing the likelihood of repeating a grade and getting 
suspended from school (see also, Almond et al., 2009 and Lavy et al., 2015). 
This paper's contribution is to study the impact of the largest oil spill in U.S. history, an exogenous 
shock to the coastal regions, on air quality and infant health outcomes. We investigate the impact 
on women already pregnant at the moment of the oil spill. Our study does not suffer from selection 
bias. We also contribute to the literature by distinguishing the impact of the oil spill by mother 
characteristics: race, education, marital status and age. 
3.3 DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL DESCRIPTION, DATA SOURCES AND 
DESCRPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.3.1 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
The Deepwater horizon Oil spill (also called Gulf of Mexico oil spill or BP oil spill) is recognized 
as the worst oil spill in U.S. history and one of the worst environmental disaster.23 The Deepwater 
Horizon rig was situated in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 40 miles off the coast of Louisiana. 
On April 20, 2010, a final cement seal of an oil well failed, causing the disaster. Of the 126 workers 
aboard the oil rig, 11 were killed. The well was capped on July 15, 2010 (87 days later). The U.S. 
Government estimates than 4.9 million barrels of oil were released into the Gulf of Mexico over 
that 87-day period. By early June 2010, oil had washed up on Louisiana's coast and along the 
Mississippi, Florida, Texas and Alabama coastlines. In December 2012, several miles of coastline 
remained subject to evaluation and/or cleanup operations. Figure 3.1 presents the map of coastal 
                                                 
23 For more details, see National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, (2011), Reddy et al, (2012), 
Michael et al (2013) and On Scene Coordinator Report: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2011). 
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counties and narrow coastal counties.24 The oil spill, along with the response and cleanup activities, 
caused extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats and fishing and tourism industries. In July 
2015, British Petroleum (BP) agreed to pay nearly 19 billion dollars to settle liabilities related to 
the oil spill. 
 
 
States Counties/ Parishes 
Florida Bay*, Calhoun, Charlotte*, Citrus*, Collier*, De Soto, Dixie*, Escambia*, 
Franklin*, Gadsden, Gilchrist, Glades, Gulf*, Hardee, Hernando*, Hillsborough, 
Holmes, Jackson, Jefferson*, Lafayette, Lee*, Leon, Levy*, Liberty, Madison, 
Manatee*, Marion, Monroe*, Okaloosa*, Pasco*, Pinellas*, Polk, Santa Rosa*, 
Sarasota*, Sumter, Suwannee, Taylor*, Wakulla*, Walton*, Washington. 
Alabama Baldwin*, Clarke, Covington, Escambia, Geneva, Mobile*, Monroe, Washington. 
Louisiana Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Calcasieu, Cameron*, East 
Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Iberia*, Iberville, Jefferson*, Jefferson 
Davis, Lafayette*, Lafourche*, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines*, Pointe Coupee, 
Rapides, Sabine, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist, 
St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary*, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne*, 
Vermilion*, Vernon, Washington, West Baton Rouge, West Feliciana. 
                                                 
24 We use the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s List of Coastal Counties for the Bureau of the 
Census Statistical Abstract Series. Coastal counties represent our treatment group. Narrow coastal counties are used as 
our treatment group in Table A.4. List of coastal counties and narrow coastal counties are available in Figure 3.1. 
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Texas Aransas*, Austin, Bee, Brazoria*, Brooks, Calhoun*, Cameron*, Chambers*, 
Colorado, De Witt, Duval, Fayette, Fort Bend, Galveston*, Goliad, Harris, Hidalgo, 
Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson*, Jim Hogg, Jim Wells, Kenedy*, Kleberg*, Lavaca, 
Liberty, Live Oak, Matagorda*, Newton, Nueces*, Orange, Refugio, San Patricio*, 
Starr, Tyler, Victoria, Waller, Washington, Webb, Wharton, Willacy*. 
Mississippi Amite, George, Hancock, Harrison*, Jackson*, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River, Pike, 
Stone, Walthall, Wilkinson. 
Figure 3.1: Coastal counties and narrow coastal counties of Gulf of Mexico. * Refers to narrow coastal 
counties and parishes.  
Source: NOAA’s List of Coastal Counties for the Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract Series. 
 
3.3.2 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
We use pollution data from the U.S. EPA AirData.25 We have information on daily average 
concentrations for major pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate 
matter (Particulates), and sulfur dioxide (SO2). Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) is 1-hour daily data 
(standard of NO2 1-hour) measured in .01 parts per million (ppm). Particle pollution (PM10) is 24-
hour daily data (standard of PM10 24-hour 2006) measured in microgram per cubic meter (µg/m3). 
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) is 1-hour daily data (standard of SO2 1-hour 2010) measured in .01 parts per 
million (ppm). Carbon monoxide (CO) is 1-hour daily data (pollutant standard of CO 1-hour 1971) 
measured in parts per million (ppm). The pollutants are covered by the Clean Air Act and are 
targeted by the EPA for their negative impacts on health, on the environment, as well as on 
properties. Of those pollutants, Particulates have the strongest impacts on health and can lead to, or 
exacerbate respiratory problems, especially for people with asthma. NO2 and SO2 also contribute 
to the formation of Particulates. We use monitoring stations near the oil spill as our treatment and 
use the other monitoring stations as our control group. 
 
 
                                                 
25 See www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/ for details. Similar data is used in Beland and Boucher, 2015. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 Treatment Group  Control Group 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  
          Mother characteristics 
Mother has college degree  0.1829 [0.3866]  0.2316 [0.4219] 
Mother has some college  0.1447 [0.3518]  0.1413 [0.3483] 
Mother has high school or less  0.4038 [0.4907]  0.3117 [0.4632] 
Mother is white  0.4060 [0.4911]  0.5486 [0.4976] 
Mother is black  0.1929 [0.3946]  0.1418 [0.3488] 
Mother is Hispanic  0.3621 [0.4806]  0.2316 [0.4218] 
Mother’s age  26.6552 [6.0803]  27.6541 [6.1099] 
Mother is less than 20 year old  0.1240 [0.3296]  0.0936 [0.2912] 
Mother is 20 to 35 years old  0.7870 [0.4094]  0.7942 [0.4043] 
Mother is over 35 year old  0.0890 [0.2848]  0.1122 [0.3156] 
         Risk factors of pregnancy 
Fewer than 4 prenatal visits  0.1331 [0.3397]  0.0951 [0.2934] 
Mother is married  0.5356 [0.4987]  0.6026 [0.4894] 
Infant is male  0.5107 [0.4999]  0.5118 [0.4999] 
First in birth order  0.3892 [0.4876]  0.4007 [0.4900] 
Second in birth order  0.3092 [0.4622]  0.3149 [0.4645] 
Third in birth order  0.1755 [0.3804]  0.1649 [0.3711] 
Fourth or higher in birth order  0.1243 [0.3299]  0.1135 [0.3171] 
Multiple Births  0.0311 [0.1737]  0.0344 [0.1823] 
         Father characteristics 
Father is less than 20 years old  0.0408 [0.1977]  0.0301 [0.1708] 
Father is 20 to 35 years old  0.7209 [0.4486]  0.7439 [0.4365] 
Father is over 35 years old  0.0783 [0.2686]  0.0904 [0.2867] 
Father is white  0.3479 [0.4763]  0.4812 [0.4996] 
Father is black  0.1438 [0.3509]  0.1056 [0.3073] 
Father is Hispanic  0.3065 [0.4610]  0.2026 [0.4019] 
Note: This table shows summary statistics. Time period is 2006 to 2012.   
Observations for treatment group: 2,007,345; Observations for control group: 26,430,611  
       Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
 
The main dataset used in this paper is the National Vital Statistics data from National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS). Vital Statistics from NCHS provides birth data of all the births registered 
in the fifty U.S. states. We use data from 2006 to 2012. We have access to millions of birth 
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observations and we have counties identifiers.26 We use this dataset to investigate the impact of the 
oil spill on infant health outcomes including premature births (<37 weeks of gestation), low birth 
weight (<2500 grams), gestation in weeks, and birth weight in grams. The mean gestation in our 
sample is 38.6 weeks and the mean birth weight is 3270.96 grams. The incidence of premature and 
low birth weight are 11.9% and 8.01%, respectively. This dataset also enables us to control for the 
age, education, race, marital status, and other risk factors of the pregnancy including plurality, place 
of the birth, prenatal visits, sex of the infant, and characteristics of fathers. We also use this dataset 
to investigate the impact of the oil spill by identifying characteristics of the mother. 
We present in Table 3.1 descriptive statistics for outcome and control variables, including 
characteristics of mothers and fathers over our sample of years (2006 to 2012) for our treatment 
and control group. Table 3.1 shows the two are similar but our treatment group has a higher fraction 
of blacks and Hispanics.  
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
We first estimate the impact of the Deep Horizon oil spill on air quality. We use a Difference in 
Difference strategy. We estimate the following: 
𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑡 =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑐𝑡 ∗  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 + 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 +                
𝛽4𝑋𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽𝑀  +  𝛽𝑌 +  𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡
2 +  𝜀𝑐𝑡                                                                      (3.1) 
𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑡 measures the air quality for the air monitoring stations close to county c at time t. 
We use information on daily average concentrations for major pollutants: NO2, PM10, SO2, and 
CO. 𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑐𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for Oil Spill County (OSC) and zero 
                                                 
26 We made a request and got access to the restricted data from National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) for this 
project. The restricted data gives access to county identifiers. 
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otherwise. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 is a variable indicating that the oil spill occurred at time t. It takes value 
of one for the years post 2010 (after the oil spill of the Gulf of Mexico) and takes value of zero for 
the years prior to 2010. We use data from 2006 to 2012. 𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑐𝑡 ∗  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 is the interaction 
term identifying the treatment group for whether the county c is affected by the oil spill in years 
post 2010. 𝛽2 is the coefficient of interest which captures the impact of the oil spill on air quality 
in the nearest monitoring stations.  
Our comparison group is other monitoring stations in non-Gulf states. There is potential spillover 
for pollution to other monitoring stations, therefore our estimates will be a lower bound. 𝛽𝑀, 𝛽𝑌, 
and 𝛽𝑆 represents month, year and state fixed effects and 𝛾𝑡 and 𝛾𝑡
2 are state time trends (linear and 
quadratic). 
Similarly, we estimate the impact of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on infant health outcomes. 
We estimate the following equation:  
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑐𝑡 +   𝛽2𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 +  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 + 
𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽𝑀  +  𝛽𝑌 +  𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡
2 +  𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                                                                             (3.2) 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 represents the outcome variable for mother i at county c and year t. We consider 
the following infant health outcomes: gestation in weeks, premature birth (< 37 weeks of gestation), 
birth weight (in grams) and low birth weight (< 2500 grams). 𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes 
value of one if mother lives in an Oil Spill county (OSC) and zero otherwise. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 and 
𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙2010 are defined as above. 𝛽2 is the coefficient of interest which captures the 
impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes. 
Our comparison group is other infants born in the same period in states and counties that did not 
get affected by the oil spill. 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a vector of characteristics of mothers with information on race, 
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age, marital status and education, as well as risk factors of the pregnancy. 𝛽𝑀, 𝛽𝑌, and 𝛽𝑆 represents 
month, year and state fixed effects and 𝛾
𝑡
 and 𝛾𝑡
2 are state time trends (linear and quadratic).  
In the heterogeneity and robustness sections, we investigate if results are robust to several different 
control groups, robustness checks and placebo tests. We also present results by mother 
characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The sample is limited to mothers 
between the ages of 20 to 45 years old. 
3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Main Results 
We first look at the impact of the oil spill on air pollution in coastal counties, using air monitoring 
stations. Table 3.2 presents results for major pollutants: PM10, NO2, SO2, and C0. Table 3.2 shows 
that the concentrations of NO2, PM10 and SO2 increased significantly in monitoring stations close 
to the oil spill and therefore the air quality is negatively affected. 
We next investigate the impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes. Table 3.3 shows the impact 
of the oil spill for several infant health outcomes. Column (1) of Table 3.3 investigates if the oil 
spill has an impact on the incidence of having a premature baby, column (2) investigates the impact 
of the oil spill on incidence of low birth weight (< 2500g). Column (3) and (4) study the impact of 
the oil spill on the gestation (in weeks) and the birthweight (in grams). Table 3.3 shows that the oil 
spill significantly increases the incidence of premature and low birth weight babies. It also 
significantly decreases the gestation in weeks and birth weight in grams. The coefficients are small 
but precisely estimated. Table 3.3 shows that the oil spill of the Gulf of Mexico has significant 
negative impact on infant health outcomes. 
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Table 3.2: Impact of oil spill on air pollutants 
 (1) (2) (3) (6) 
 PM10 NO2 SO2 CO 
Oil spill 2.8945** 5.3285** 2.5391** 0.0162 
 (1.1203) (2.2072) (1.2415) (0.0178) 
N 966687 827971 1013119 747828 
Note: This table shows the impact of oil spill shock in April 20 2010 on air pollutants. All the 
regressions include month, year and state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends.  
Standard errors are clustered at the county level.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: US EPA AirData. 
Table 3.3: impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature  lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
Oil Sill 0.0075*** 0.0030*** -0.0752*** -9.5735*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0206) (2.3829) 
N 24755728 24755728 24755728 24755728 
Note: This table shows the main results. Control variables consist of mother characteristics 
including mother’s age, mother’s education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk 
factors of the pregnancy including birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and 
whether the child is male as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include 
month, year and state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Time period is 2006 
to 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
3.5.2Heterogeneity and Robustness 
We next investigate several heterogeneity and robustness checks. Table 3.4 studies the impact of 
the oil spill separately for women already pregnant at the moment of the oil spill and women who 
got pregnant subsequently. Table 3.4 shows that both women already pregnant and women who got 
subsequently pregnant are both affected. Infants health outcomes are affected for both groups. 
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Table 3.4: impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes by pregnancy status at time of oil spill 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature  lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
Oil spill * pregnant 0.0073*** 0.0031*** -0.0747*** -9.4905*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0206) (2.3964) 
     
Oil spill * not pregnant 0.0146** 0.0057** -0.0904*** -11.5580*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0026) (0.0314) (3.4212) 
     
N 24755728 24755728 24755728 24755728 
Note: This table shows the results by pregnancy status at the moment of the oil spill, using 
interaction terms. Control variables consist of mother characteristics including mother’s age, 
mother’s education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk factors of the pregnancy 
including birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and whether the child is male 
as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include month, year and state 
fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Time period is 2006 to 2012. Standard errors 
are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
 
Table 3.5 studies the impact of the oil spill on health outcomes by trimesters for women already 
pregnant at the moment of the oil spill, using interaction terms. It shows that the negative impact is 
significantly more pronounced for mothers in the third trimester when the oil spill occurs, but the 
negative impact is present in the other trimesters which is consistent with the literature. 
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Table 3.5: The effect of the oil spill on infant health outcomes at different trimesters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
Oil spill * 3rd Trimester 0.0070*** 0.0037*** -0.0659*** -8.6037*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0247) (2.9036) 
     
Oil spill * 2nd Trimester 0.0030 0.0001 -0.0545** -4.4341* 
 (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0250) (2.5838) 
     
Oil spill * 1st Trimester 0.0054** -0.0013 -0.0755*** 5.0466 
 (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0233) (3.6516) 
     
N 18171420 18171420 18171420 18171420 
Note: This table shows the results for the impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes for 
different trimesters for mother’s already pregnant, using interaction terms. Time spans have been 
limited to include women who have been exposed to the oil spill shock either at first, second or 
third trimesters of pregnancy. Control variables consist of mother characteristics including mother’s 
age, mother’s education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk factors of the 
pregnancy including birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and whether the child 
is male as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include month, year and 
state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
 
Table 3.6 presents heterogeneity estimates by individual characteristics of mothers including race 
(white, black, and Hispanic), age groups (age is less than 25, age 26 to 35 and above 35), educational 
attainment (college graduate, some college, and high school and less than high school), and marital 
status (married, unmarried). Table 3.6 shows higher adverse infant health outcomes for blacks, less 
educated, unmarried, and younger mothers. This suggests important policy implications as certain 
mothers are more affected by the oil spill. Results of Table 3.6 point to avoidance measures that 
certain mothers can successfully apply against negative impacts of pollution.  
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneity effect of oil spill on infant health outcome for all women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 all College Some 
college 
High School 
Or less 
Age  
over 35 
Age  
26-35 
Panel A       
premature 0.0075*** -0.0015 0.0032 0.0100*** 0.0012 0.0085*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0024) 
       
LBW 0.0032*** -0.0015 -0.0009 0.0054*** 0.0014 0.0025** 
 (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0013) 
       
Gestation -0.0752*** -0.0021 -0.0111 -0.1150*** -0.0355 -0.0839*** 
(weeks) (0.0206) (0.0265) (0.0191) (0.0331) (0.0329) (0.0229) 
       
BW -9.5735*** -0.0329 -4.1539 -13.6900*** -4.5680 -10.4136*** 
(gr) (2.3829) (2.9940) (2.9571) (3.4004) (5.3159) (3.2329) 
       
N 24755728 5747765 3494949 7782129 2789663 12414069 
       
Panel B       
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Age  
below 25 
White Black Hispanic Married Unmarried 
premature 0.0063** -0.0002 0.0105*** 0.0133*** 0.0053** 0.0087*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0028) 
       
LBW 0.0033** 0.0004 0.0037 0.0050*** 0.0010 0.0049*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0016) 
       
Gestation -0.0680*** -0.0154 -0.0568* -0.1481*** -0.0674*** -0.0771*** 
(weeks) (0.0201) (0.0218) (0.0293) (0.0366) (0.0218) (0.0217) 
       
BW -8.1875*** -0.6945 -5.6555 -18.8441*** -6.8995** -11.6754*** 
(gr) (2.6482) (2.8394) (5.5135) (4.4416) (2.8677) (3.0754) 
       
N 9551996 13760277 3423073 5657582 14899952 9855776 
Note: This table shows the results for the impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes for mothers 
who have been exposed to the oil spill shock in their third trimester of pregnancy. Control variables 
consist of mother characteristics including mother’s age, mother’s education, mother’s race, whether 
mother is married, and risk factors of the pregnancy including birth order, an indicator for whether it 
is a multiple birth, and whether the child is male as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All 
the regressions include month, year and state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. 
Time period is 2006 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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We next implement placebo tests in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 which presents robustness tests for 
differential time trends in the DID analysis. These placebo interactions between indicators of years 
2007, 2008, and 2009 and an indicator for treatment group should have no significant impact on air 
quality and infant health outcomes. If there is a positive significant relationship, then there are 
correlations between the trend and the oil spill. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show that placebo treatments do 
not produce significant effect on air quality and infant health outcomes. We take this as further 
evidence that prior trends are not generating these results. This gives confidence in our main results 
of Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
Table 3.7: Placebo test for the impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
Oil spill * April 2007 -0.0119 -0.0006 -0.0170 -1.7491 
 (0.0439) (0.0006) (0.0107) (1.6999) 
     
Oil spill * April 2008 -0.0074 0.0008 -0.0212 -2.9668 
 (0.0286) (0.0012) (0.0151) (2.4524) 
     
Oil spill * April 2009 -0.0067 -0.0010 0.0123 2.2950 
 (0.0174) (0.0007) (0.0121) (1.6768) 
Note: This table shows the results for the placebo effect of oil spill on April 2007, April 2009, and 
April 2012 on infant health outcomes. Control variables consist of mother characteristics including 
mother’s age, mother’s education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk factors of the 
pregnancy including birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and whether the child 
is male as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include month, year and 
state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Time period is 2006 to 2012. Standard 
errors are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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Table 3.8: Placebo test for the impact of the oil spill on pollutants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PM10 NO2 SO2 CO 
Oil spill * April 2007 -1.4095 3.2934 1.0743 0.0101 
 (0.9567) (3.5050) (2.9726) (0.0231) 
     
Oil spill * April 2008 0.9379 -1.3850 1.4761 -0.0123 
 (0.8206) (3.8463) (1.6238) (0.0216) 
     
Oil spill * April 2009 -1.1607 3.3182 2.7348 -0.0019 
 (0.8958) (3.3040) (1.7159) (0.0149) 
Note: This table shows the results for the placebo effect of oil spill on April 2007, April 2009, and 
April 2012 on air pollution.  All the regressions include month, year and state fixed effects and state 
linear and quadratic time trends.  Standard errors are clustered at the county level.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: US EPA AirData. 
 
Appendix B Table B.1 presents the impact of the Oil spill on air quality using different persistence 
of the impact. Results are robust to different time frames. Appendix B Table B.2 presents a similar 
exercise for infant health outcomes. Results are once again robust to different time frames.  
Appendix B Table B.3 investigates the impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes for pregnant 
women at the moment of the oil spill and distinguished by trimester. It shows the effect is more 
pronounced in the third trimester. Appendix B Table B.4 investigates different definitions of the 
treatment group. It shows that when the treatment group is defined as narrow coastal counties (most 
exposed to the oil spill) or the whole gulf states (to consider possible spill over), the results on infant 
health outcomes are similar. It shows that oil spill in all alternate definitions of the treatment group 
significantly increases the incidence of premature babies and low birth weight babies and 
significantly decreases the gestation in weeks and birth weight in grams. Appendix B Table B.5 
investigates heterogeneity of the impact for different coastal states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi and Texas). 
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It shows that infant health outcomes are affected in coastal counties in all Gulf coast states.27 
Appendix B Table B.6 reproduces the heterogeneity table (table 3.6) for mothers during the third 
trimester during the oil spill. These mothers were in the last trimester of their pregnancy at the 
moment of the oil spill. Results are similar to Table 3.6, it shows once again higher adverse infant 
health outcomes for blacks, less educated, unmarried, and younger mothers. Appendix B Table B.7 
investigates if the oil spill has impact on mother's decision to have a child. Table B.7 studies the 
propensity of having a new baby in coastal counties by birth order. It shows no statistically 
significant effect on propensity of having a (or anther) baby. In other words, Table B.7 shows that 
mothers did not decide to postpone having a (or another) child because of the oil spill incident. 
Overall, results are robust to alternative specifications and robustness checks. These numerous 
robustness checks provide confidence that oil spill increases air pollution and has negative impact 
on infant health outcomes. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the impact of the oil spill of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico on air pollution and 
health outcomes of newborns. Using a Difference in Difference methodology, air data from EPA 
and Vital Statistics data from National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), we find that the oil 
spill of 2010 decreases the air quality in coastal counties and has significant negative impact on 
infant health outcomes. Particularly, we find that the oil spill increases incidence of low birth weight 
(< 2500 gr) and incidence of premature births (< 37 weeks of gestation). We also find that the oil 
spill significantly decreases the gestation in weeks and birth weight in grams of babies born in 
                                                 
27 However, Mississippi shows significant negative impact only on birth weight. 
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coastal counties. Heterogeneity effects reveal higher adverse infant health outcomes for black 
mothers, less educated mothers, unmarried, and mothers less than 20 years old. The results have 
important policy implications because it suggests that vulnerable groups are more affected by 
pollution shock. Our results point to avoidance measures that certain mothers can successfully apply 
against negative impacts of pollution. Results are robust to a wide range of controls and robustness 
checks.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: PARTY AFFILIATION AND PUBLIC SPENDING: EVIDENCE 
FROM U.S. GOVERNORS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Some major cuts to state education and health budgets have been widely discussed in the news. For 
example, in 2011, Pennsylvania’s Republican governor proposed slashing the state’s higher 
education funding by hundreds of millions of dollars. In 2015, Illinois’ Republican governor 
decided to cut $300 million from the health care system. Louisiana’s Republican governor’s 2015 
budget plan proposed offsetting a $1.6 billion funding shortfall largely through budget cuts to 
education. These cuts are generally associated with Republican governors. It is commonly believed 
that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to support social policies, increase government 
involvement, and spend a higher share of their budget on key sectors such as education and health. 
Despite the above anecdotal evidence, the literature is ambiguous as to whether party affiliation of 
governors (Democratic vs. Republican) matters regarding allocation of public expenditures. 
Inconsistent results regarding the impact of party affiliation on budgetary decisions are often due 
to a failure to address endogeneity concerns or small sample of years, which yields imprecise 
estimates. In this paper, we use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to investigate the causal 
impact of the party affiliation of governors on distributive budgetary decisions over key sectors 
(education, health/hospitals, public safety, social welfare and we combine the other sectors). We 
match gubernatorial election data with state government finance data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
for 1960–2012. 
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Our results support the existence of gubernatorial partisan differences over budgetary decisions. 
We find that under Democratic governors, the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, and 
public safety sectors is, respectively 2.4, 4.9 and 3.8% higher and there is a decrease in the other 
sectors (−2.3%). Other sectors are combined as follow: highway, natural resources, parks and 
recreation, interest on general debt, and governmental administration. We find no significant impact 
of political party of governors on total spending, only on the allocation of funds. This is important 
because the literature documents benefits to higher funding to education and health (e.g., Barro 
1991; Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein 2010; Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson 2002; Martin et al. 
2012). Results are robust to different RD specifications, controls, and robust-ness checks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the role of governors and reviews 
the literature; Section 4.3 presents the methodology; Section 4.4 discusses the data and descriptive 
analysis; Section 4.5 presents the main results, heterogeneity, and sensitivity analysis; and Section 
4.6 concludes. 
4.2 ROLE OF GOVERNORS AND RELATED LITERATURE 
4.2.1 Role of Governors 
Governors have a high degree of autonomy in the administration of their state. As head of the 
executive branch the governor prepares and administers the budget, sets policies, recommends 
legislation, signs laws, and appoints department heads. Governors can veto bills, which gives them 
considerable control over policies. In all but seven states, governors have the power to use a line-
item veto on appropriations bills; this gives the governor the authority to reject part of a bill passed 
by the legislature that involves taxing or spending. In some states, the governor has additional roles, 
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such as commander-in-chief of the National Guard, and has partial or absolute power to commute 
or pardon criminal sentences. 
4.2.2. Related Literature 
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the impact of partisan allegiance (Democratic vs. 
Republican) on economic outcomes at the state level. Besley and Case (1995) find a positive and 
significant impact of Democratic lame duck governors on income taxes, workers’ compensation 
benefits and spending during 1950–1986.28 In another study, they show that the unified effect of a 
Democratic governor and Democrats controlling both the upper and lower houses of the legislature 
has a positive impact on total taxes, income taxes, total spending, and family assistance (Besley and 
Case 2003). Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) find that the party in power allocates more funds 
towards counties that provide them with the strongest electoral support. Leigh (2008) investigates 
the gubernatorial partisan impact on numerous policy settings, economic and social outcomes 
during the period 1941–2001. He finds few differences between Democratic and Republican 
governors’ out-comes and no impact on state spending. He finds a slightly higher minimum wage, 
lower post-tax inequality, and unemployment rate under Democratic governors. Joshi (2015), using 
an RDD, finds no impact of gubernatorial partisanship on health expenditures during the 1991–
2009 period. Fredriksson, Wang, and Warren (2013), using an RDD, investigate the effect of 
gubernatorial party affiliation on tax policies from 1970 to 2007; they find that the impact is 
dependent on whether the governor is a lame duck or eligible for re-election. While re-electable 
Democrats tend to increase income taxes, lame duck Democrats tend to decrease them. Beland 
                                                 
28 Lame duck governors are those who are in their last term and are facing binding term limits. In other words, lame 
duck governors cannot run for another term. 
53 
 
 
(2015) and Beland and Unel (2015a), using RDD, find that minorities such as blacks and 
immigrants have better labor-market outcomes under Democratic rather than Republican 
governors.29 
There are other studies investigating the partisan impact at other levels of government in the United 
States and in other countries. By example, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), using an RDD, find no 
significant party affiliation impact of the mayor on th e size of city government, spending, 
and crime rate. Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), using an RDD, find that party affiliation has a large 
impact on a legislator’s voting behavior. Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010) study the impact of the 
President on the distribution of federal funds. They find that districts and counties receive more 
federal outlays when legislators in the president’s party represent them. Albouy (2013) studies the 
impact of partisan allegiance in Congress on allocation of funds. He finds that members of Congress 
in the majority receive greater federal grants. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), using an RDD, finds a 
positive party effect of left-wing government on spending and taxation using Swedish local 
government data. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating the causal impact of party affiliation of the 
governor on distributive budgetary decisions over key sectors using RDD and the long time period 
of 1960–2012. 
                                                 
29 Other studies at the U.S. gubernatorial level study the impact of political parties on tax code reform (Ash 2015), on 
unionized workers (Beland and Unel 2015b), and on pollution (Beland and Boucher 2015). 
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4.3 RD METHODOLOGY                 
Following Lee (2001, 2008), we use an RDD to investigate whether the party affiliation of the 
governor (Democratic vs. Republican) has a causal impact on the allocation of state spending. 
Endogeneity concerns surrounding election outcomes come from factors such as labor-market 
conditions, voter characteristics, quality of candidates, the resources available for campaigns, and 
other unmeasured characteristics of states and candidates that would bias estimates of the impact 
of the party allegiance of governors. These factors can influence who wins the election. Lee (2001, 
2008) demonstrates that looking at close elections provides quasi-random variation in winners and 
allows for the identification of causal effects of political parties. Similar methodology is used in 
papers such as Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), Ferreira and Gyourko 
(2009, 2014), and Beland (2015). We use a parametric RDD approach as our primary specification. 
We estimate: 
𝑌𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑠𝑡 +   𝑓(𝑀𝑂𝑉𝑠𝑡) +  𝑇𝑡𝛽2 +  𝑆𝑠𝛽3 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝛽4 +  𝜀𝑠𝑡                                            (4.1) 
𝑌𝑠𝑡 represents the share of state spending on different budgetary sectors at state s and year t. We use 
the share of expenditure as our outcome variable to reflect policy choices of governors over the 
allocation of the state government budget. We consider the following sectors: education, 
health/hospital, public safety, social welfare, and we combine the other sectors.30 We also present 
results for outcome: log of total expenditures in the state. 𝐷𝑠𝑡 takes value of one if the winner of the 
election at state s and year t is a Democrat and zero if the winner is a Republican. β1 is the 
                                                 
30 Other sectors group as follow: Highway, natural resources, parks and recreation, interest on general debt, and 
governmental administration. We combine them under Other sectors for brevity, all have individually non-positive 
coefficients. A description of those sectors is available here: http:// www.census.gov/govs/state/definitions.html 
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coefficient of interest which shows the effect of the Democratic governor on the share of state 
spending in the above sectors. 𝑀𝑂𝑉𝑠𝑡 represents the margin of victory of the elected governor at 
the most recent election. Elections are held in November and the elected governor takes office the 
following January. Considering a term length of 4 years, political affiliation and margin of victory 
of the elected governor are used for the consecutive 4 years after taking the office. Margin of victory 
is the difference between the percentage of the vote cast for the winner and the candidate who 
finished second. Zero defines the cutoff point of the margin of victory and it takes positive values 
if the winner is a Democrat and negative values if the winner is a Republican. We estimate the party 
affiliation impact of the governor on the state spending controlling for the margin of victory, using 
a second order polynomial: 𝑓(𝑀𝑂𝑉𝑠𝑡). Separate polynomials are being fit to separate sides of the 
equation. 𝑋𝑠𝑡 represents time-varying controls used in some specifications regarding states’ 
demographic and political characteristics. Demographic characteristics include population, and 
whether the state is located in the south. Political characteristics include majority of Democrats in 
the state legislature (House and Senate), re-electability and gender of the governor.31 𝑇𝑡 and 𝑆𝑠 are 
state and year fixed effects and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 represents a vector of linear and quadratic state-specific time 
trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for potential serial correlation 
within a state over time. Following Lee and Lemieux (2014), we also present different polynomials 
(linear, cubic and quartic polynomials) and local-linear RDD. 
                                                 
31 Upper house and lower house majority are two dummies illustrating whether the majority of the state legislators in 
the senate or house are Democrat or Republican. Values of one indicate that the majority of the state legislators is 
Demo-crat and values of zero show that the majority is Republican. Both majority is a dummy variable getting value 
of one if the majority of both upper house and lower house are Democrats and zero otherwise. 
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4.4 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.4.1 Data  
The U.S. Census Bureau provides a data set called State Government Finances which presents a 
comprehensive annual summary of state governments expenditures; data are available from 1960 
to 2012. We use variables of state government spending on education, health/hospitals, public 
safety, social welfare, and group all others. Other sectors group as follow: highway, natural 
resources and parks and recreation, interest on general debt, and governmental administration. 
Gubernatorial election data come from two main sources: Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research (ICPSR) 7757 (1995) files called Candidate and Constituency Statistics of 
Elections in the United States for elections prior to 1990, and the Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections 
(Leip 2015) for post-1990 elections. We only keep elections where the political party of the elected 
governor is either a Democrat or Republican.32 Variables taken from these sources are the political 
party of the winner and the margin of victory. As described above, the margin of victory is the 
difference between the percentage of vote cast for the winner and the candidate who finished 
second. It takes positive values if a Democrat won and negative values otherwise. We also include 
other characteristics of elections and other level of government. As mentioned above, we control in 
                                                 
32 There are 40 observations in our sample where the elected governors are neither Democrat nor Republican. We 
exclude these observations from the sample. There are some cases in which the governor changed mid-term. It can 
happen in three conditions including: death, resignation, or impeachment of the governor. In these cases, the lieutenant 
governor or the executive officer of a state who is next in rank to a governor takes the governor’s place. We kept 
observations where the new governor has the same political party as the previous one using the margin of victory of 
the previous governor as they are usually elected on the same ticket. We dropped observations where the new governor 
is from a different political party than the previous one. 
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some specifications, for which party controls the state house and senate, gender of the governor, 
and re-electability. These data come from Klarner’s political data site at Indiana State University.33 
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
In our sample, there are 2,343 years in office which includes 1,269 years (54%) governed by 
Democrats. Table 4.1 shows the number of years governed by either a Republican or Democratic 
governor and the number of elections where either a Democratic or Republican governor was 
elected by a sub-interval of years. It shows that Democratic governors are slightly more frequently 
in power than Republicans over this period. 
Table 4.1: Number of Gubernatorial Elections and Years in Office 
Years in Office 1960-2012 1960-1979 1980-2000 2001-2012 
All governors  2343 865 930 548 
Democratic governor 1269 514 481 274 
Republican governor 1074 351 449 274 
Percentage Democratic governor 54 59 51 50 
Number of Elections     
All elections 660 268 247 145 
Democratic governor elected 365 157 136 72 
Republican governor elected 
Percentage Democratic governor   
295 
52  
111 
56 
111 
50 
73 
50 
Note: Years in office and number of elections won for Democrats and Republicans by sub-intervals 
of years.  
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995) and Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011). 
 
Table 4.2 shows the number of elected governors by margin of victory (5%, 10%, and 15%). There 
are 1,025 years in office at the margin of victory of 10%, 519 of which are governed by Democrats. 
At the margin of victory of 5 percentage points there are 540 years in office and Democratic 
governors are in office for 257 of them. Table 4.2 provides evidence that the number of Democratic 
                                                 
33 Data are available at: http://klarnerpolitics.com/kp-dataset-page.html 
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and Republican governors are balanced for close elections. We discuss this more formally in the 
Sensitivity/Validity of RDD section. Table 4.2 also presents the probability of switching party in 
power for close elections (i.e., p(Rt + 1|Dt) and (Dt + 1|Rt) ). Table 4.2 shows that for close 
elections, those probabilities are very close to 50% in both cases. 
Table 4.2: Numbers of Years in Office at Different Values of Margin of Victory 
Years in Office 
Margin of Victory 
5 % 
Margin of Victory 
10 % 
Margin of Victory 
15 % 
All governors 540 1025 1425 
Democratic governor 257 519 706 
Republican governor 283 506 719 
𝑝(𝑅𝑡+1|𝐷𝑡) 0.52 0.52 0.50 
𝑝(𝐷𝑡+1|𝑅𝑡) 0.48 0.48 0.50 
Note: Margin of victory is the difference between the percentage of vote cast for the winner and 
the candidate who finished second. Small values of margin of victory are representative of close 
elections. This table shows the balance of the number of Democratic and Republican governors 
at different values of margin of victory.  
Source: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
Appendix C, Table C.1 shows summary statistics regarding the share of spending on education, 
health/hospitals, public safety, social welfare and other sectors and reports that the average spending 
is respectively 33, 6, 3, 15, and 42% of the state budget.34 
4.4.3 Graphical Evidence 
As is customary in RDD analysis, we next turn to graphical evidence. Figure 4.1 presents the 
discontinuity at 0% of the margin of victory. Each dot in these graphs represents the average of the 
outcome variable at state s and year t, grouped by margin of victory intervals. The vertical axis 
                                                 
34 Table C.2 presents descriptive statistics by political party break-up (Democrats vs Republicans). It shows a higher 
share of spending on education and health/hospital when Democratic governors are in power. 
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measures share of state spending and horizontal axis indicates margin of victory. The solid line 
shows the fitted values. Figure 4.1 shows a higher share of state government expenditure on 
education, health/hospitals, and public safety when Democratic governors are in office. There is no 
discontinuity on the share of spending on social welfare and the share of spending is lower for the 
other sectors. The graphs suggest that some money is shifted from the other sectors to the education, 
health/hospitals, and public safety sectors under Democratic governors. The following section 
estimates these effects precisely (Figure 4.2).35 
 
                                                 
35 Figure 4.2 presents RD graphs for margin of victory for highly contested elections (−5% to +5%). It presents 
observations, predicted values, and fitted polynomials. Figure 4.2 also points to the same conclusion as Figure 4.1. 
There is an increase in the share of spending on education and health/hospital and a decrease in other sectors. 
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A – Education                   B- Health/Hospital 
 
C- Public Safety               D – Social Welfare 
 
                                                     E- Others                        F- Total spending 
 
Figure 4.1: Margin of Victory and share of Spending on Education (A), Health/Hospital (B), share of Spending on Public Safety 
(C), share of Spending on Social Welfare (D), share of Spending on Others (E), and log of total spending (F). 
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A – Education                   B- Health/Hospital
 
C- Public Safety               D – Social Welfare 
 
                                                     E- Others                        F- Total spending 
 
Figure 4.2: Margin of Victory (-5% to +5%) and share of Spending on Education (A), Health/Hospital (B), share of 
Spending on Public Safety (C), share of Spending on Social Welfare (D), share of Spending on Others (E), and log of total 
spending (F). %). It presents observations, predicted values and fitted polynomials. 
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4.5 RESULTS 
4.5.1 Main Results  
Table 4.3 presents results using the RDD specification. The first row shows the party affiliation 
impact of the governor using a quadratic polynomial without inclusion of any control variables. 
Table 4.3 shows that shares of spending on education and health/hospitals are significantly higher 
under Democratic governors by 2.6% and 4.3%, respectively. Public safety spending is also 
significantly higher by 3.6%. Table 4.3 shows that there is no difference over the budgetary 
decision on social welfare between Democrats and Republicans, and the share of spending on the 
other sectors is 2.1% lower under Democratic governors. 
The second row of Table 4.3 investigates the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of control 
variables. In a valid RDD, the estimated party affiliation impact of the governor should not be 
sensitive to adding control variables. Results are robust to adding different control variables. These 
results also show that Democratic governors spend a significantly higher share of the budget on 
education (+2.4%), health/hospitals (+4.9%), and public safety sectors (+3.8%); and less on the 
other sectors (−2.3%).36 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Tables also present multiple hypothesis testing à la Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and the results hold. 
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Table 4.3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Total spending & Share of Spending by 
sectors 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, public safety, 
social welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The number of observations is 
2343. Control variables are the population and personal income of the states, dummy whether the 
majority of the state legislators in the Senate or House are Democrats or Republicans. We also 
add a dummy for governors being lame duck or female. We also include a dummy for south, if 
the state is located in the south region. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the 
state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) multiple 
hypothesis testing is presented. 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
4.5.2 Sensitivity/ Validity of RDD   
 We next undertake several sensitivity checks to examine the validity of our RDD estimates. The 
main idea behind the RDD is that states with margin of victory just below the cutoff are good 
comparisons to those just above. In other words, states where Democrats barely win are similar to 
states where Republicans barely win. In a valid RDD, all variables determined prior to the 
assignment variable are independent of the treatment status (Lee and Lemieux 2014). In other 
words, political party of the governor does not have any effect on predetermined demographic and 
political characteristics of the states and governors. This is investigated in Appendix C, Table C.3 
by regressing the political party of the governor using specification (1) on the control variables: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Democratic Governor  0.0004 0.0264** 0.0434** 0.0360* -0.0157 -0.0217** 
(no control) (0.0034) (0.0108) (0.0206) (0.0187) (0.0217) (0.009) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.911 0.015 0.036 0.061 0.470 0.019 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.911 0.057 0.072 0.092 0.564 0.057 
Democratic Governor  -0.0014 0.0235** 0.0488** 0.0384* -0.0177 -0.0233** 
(with controls) (0.0036) (0.0109) (0.0218) (0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0096) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.694 0.033 0.026 0.053 0.400 0.019 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.694 0.066 0.066 0.080 0.480 0.066 
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population, majority of Democrats in the upper and lower houses, whether the governor is female. 
Results show that party affiliation of the governor has no effect on these variables. Appendix C, 
Table C.4 presents mean and standard deviation of the control variables for each party affiliation. 
Appendix C, Table C.4 shows they are in most cases similar and not statistically different. 
Appendix C, Table C.5 shows that the means of the control variables under close election datasets 
are statistically indifferent from the means of the control variables for the entire dataset. This 
suggests that close elections represent fairly well the entire dataset. 
Another central assumption for a valid RDD is continuity of the assignment variable around the 
cutoff point. The most common way to verify this assumption is the McCrary test (2008). The 
density should be smooth around the cutoff point indicating the balance of the number of 
Democratic and Republican governors. Random variation around the cutoff point is due to the 
agents’ inability to precisely control the assignment variable near the cutoff point (Lee 2008). 
Figure 4.3 exhibits the McCrary test and verifies the balance of the assignment variable around the 
threshold; there is no unusual jump.37 
                                                 
37 We also investigate whether campaign spending is different for close elections. It could be that the winning party is 
the one who spent the most, even for close elections (Caughey and Sekhon 2011). Using campaign data from Jensen 
and Beyle (2003), we find no evidence for this. 
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Figure 4.3: McCrary Density of Margin of Victory 
Following Lee and Lemieux (2014), we explore the sensitivity of the results to using different 
orders of polynomial. Panel A of Table C.6 presents results for linear, cubic, and quartic 
polynomials. Results using different polynomials are qualitatively the same as Table 4.3. 
Panel B of Appendix C, Table C.6 shows nonparametric estimations for the party effect of the 
governor on different sectors of the state budget using optimal bandwidth procedures of Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Results are qualitatively the 
same as Table 4.3. The similarity of the estimates across parametric and nonparametric methods 
is a sign of the unbiased estimate. Appendix C, Table C.7 presents results for parametric regression 
discontinuity for different close elections (bandwidths of 3, 5, 10, 12, and 15 are included). Results 
are once again robust.38 
                                                 
38 The precision is better for larger bandwidths as expected given the optimal bandwidth by IK and CCT are rather 
large. 
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One possible concern regarding the discontinuity of the outcome variable is that the jump in the 
shares of spending across sectors is a phenomenon independent from the political party of the 
governor. In other words, it could be the case that states with higher preference for education and 
health/hospitals are more likely to elect a Democratic governor, even for close elections, which 
could bias the estimated impact. In order to address this issue, we run a placebo RDD test to 
investigate the party effect on previous term spending, which is presented in Appendix C, Table 
C.8. Results do not show any significant results for outcomes in the term before the election. This 
imbues confidence that the results are not due to long term trends. 
These numerous robustness checks provide confidence in the RDD and that party allegiance of 
governors does indeed play a role in allocating state spending. It presents evidence that Democratic 
governors increase state spending on education, health/hospitals, and public safety. 
4.5.3 Potential Heterogeneity of the Effect 
We next investigate the heterogeneity of the impact. The Democratic Party has some conservative 
members whose political views are similar to their Republican counterparts, and they are generally 
from southern states. Results presented in Table 4.4 show that southern states are not statistically 
different from nonsouthern states. Tables 4.5 present RD estimates for lame-duck and re-electable 
governors, respectively. Table 4.5 shows that both re-electable governors and lame-duck 
governors spend a higher share of the budget on education, health/hospitals and less on other 
sectors. Table 4.5 also shows that lame-duck Democratic governors spend significantly more on 
education and public safety and less on other sectors than re-electable Democratic governors. 
Table 4.6 investigates the dynamics of spending within a term. Table 4.6 points out that the impact 
of Democratic governors is similar in a term. Appendix C, Table C.9 presents results for the 
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heterogeneity of the effect if Democrats hold other office. Panel A presents RD estimates for an 
interaction term for Democratic governors and Democrats being president, Panel B presents RD 
estimates for an interaction term for Democratic governors and Democrats controlling both houses, 
panel C presents RD estimates using both the interaction terms of panel A and B in the same 
specification. Appendix C, Table C.9 shows that there is no significant difference in the allocation 
of spending of Democratic governors when the president is a Democrat (Panel A) and when the 
Democrats control both houses (Panel B). This holds also when both interactions are included in 
Panel C. The total spending is however significantly higher for Democratic governors when the 
president is Democrat (Panel A and C). 
Table 4.4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Total spending & Share of Spending by 
Sectors: Southern vs Non-Southern Governors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Democratic Governor  -0.0006 0.0187** 0.0521** 0.0359** -0.0201 -0.0213** 
 (0.0041) (0.0092) (0.0254) (0.0178) (0.0230) (0.0101) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.876 0.043 0.041 0.044 0.382 0.041 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.876 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.458 0.066 
       
Democratic Governor×  -0.0027 0.0166 -0.0205 0.0086 0.0082 -0.0069 
Southern states (0.0046) (0.0106) (0.0322) (0.0278) (0.0361) (0.0128) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.558 0.117 0.525 0.758 0.821 0.595 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.821 0.702 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, public safety, 
social welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The number of observations is 
2343. Non-Southern states are the states that are not located in the south region. Standard errors 
are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. Control variables are the same as Table 4.3. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) multiple hypothesis testing 
is presented. 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table 4.5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Total spending & Share of Spending by 
sectors: Lame-duck vs Re-electable governors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Democratic Governor  -0.0022 0.0198** 0.0425** 0.0284** -0.0172 -0.0175* 
 (0.0038) (0.0096) (0.0201) (0.0128) (0.0217) (0.0072) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.579 0.045 0.035 0.027 0.428 0.016 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.579 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.514 0.068 
       
Democratic Governor×  0.0033 0.0289*** -0.0034 0.0388** 0.0069 -0.0182** 
Lame duck (0.0048) (0.0107) (0.0266) (0.0193) (0.0275) (0.0088) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.491 0.01 0.898 0.045 0.803 0.039 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.737 0.06 0.898 0.09 0.898 0.09 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, public safety, 
social welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The number of observations is 
2343. Lame-duck governors are the governors who are in their last term and are not eligible for re-
election. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. Control variables are 
the same as Table 4.3. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) multiple 
hypothesis testing is presented. 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau. 
Table 4.6: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Total spending & Share of Spending by 
sectors: First 2 years in office vs Last 2 years in office 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Democratic Governor  -0.0034 0.0233** 0.0543** 0.0430* -0.0218 -0.0242** 
 (0.0043) (0.0094) (0.0229) (0.0218) (0.0225) (0.0105) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.426 0.013 0.018 0.055 0.334 0.026 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.426 0.052 0.052 0.083 0.401 0.052 
       
Democratic Governor× 0.0042 0.0003 -0.0174 -0.0097 0.0090 0.0017 
Last two years (0.0036) (0.0089) (0.0168) (0.0120) (0.0181) (0.0067) 
Single Hypothesis P-value 0.247 0.977 0.303 0.422 0.620 0.797 
Multiple Hypothesis P-value 0.844 0.977 0.844 0.844 0.93 0.956 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, public safety, social 
welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The number of observations is 2343. Last 
two years is a dummy variable taking value of one if the governor is in his or her last two years in the 
office. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. Control variables are the 
same as Table 4.3. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) multiple 
hypothesis testing is presented. 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the partisan impact of the governor on budgetary spending. The importance 
of this paper lies in using RDD and the long period from 1960 to 2012 to investigate partisan 
differences in budgetary decisions at the state level. Using an RDD, we overcome the endogeneity 
problem due to voters’ preferences, state economic and demographic characteristics. We find that 
shares of spending on education and health/hospitals are respectively about 2.4 and 4.9 percentage 
points higher under Democratic governors. We find no significant impact of political party of 
governors on total spending, only on the allocation of funds. 
Our analysis suggests that party affiliation has a significant impact on allocation of spend-ing. Our 
results support political difference between political parties and reject the median voter theorem 
for allocation of spending. The results on allocation of funds are important because higher 
spending on education and health/hospitals can have considerable benefits (e.g., Barro 1991; 
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein 2010; Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson 2002; Martin et al. 2012). 
Our results are consistent and robust to using a wide range of controls and RD specifications. 
Future research should investigate if the additional money for health and education has further 
implications for the state.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Impact of Paid Family Leave of California on Delayed Childbearing and on Infant Health 
Outcomes 
This paper investigates the impact of the Paid Family Leave (PFL) of California on the timing of 
first births, infant health as well as labor market outcomes of mothers after their first childbirths. 
Delayed childbearing traditionally has been defined as pregnancy to women over the age of 35 and 
is an increasing phenomenon. During the period of 1970 and 2012, the first births for women 35 
years and older have increased for all races from 1.7 percent to more than 10 percent (NCHS, 
2014). Absence of generous maternity leave policies increased birth delay for all women especially 
for women with higher years of education who face higher motherhood wage penalty for exiting 
the labor force to take care of their children (Buckles, 2008). California introduces PFL in 2004 
which provides paid leave with 55 percent wage replacement. Using a Difference in Difference 
(DID) methodology and Vital Statistics data from National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), 
this paper provides policy implications regarding the influential impact of the PFL policy in 
reducing birth delay by changing the age composition of new mothers toward younger ones. 
Women over 35 years respond significantly to this policy by reducing 2 years in the timing of their 
first births on average. However, this policy has no significant impact on the decision to have first 
child earlier for women under the age of 35 who are already in normal childbearing age. 
Medical literature has well stablished that higher maternal age at first birth increases the risk of 
poor pregnancy outcomes (low birth weight, birth defects, pregnancy complications, etc) 
(Johonson and Tough, 2012; NCHS, 2014; Cnattingius et al., 1993; Guendelman et al., 2014). 
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Next, I examine the impact of the PFL policy on infant health. Results show that this policy reduces 
the incidence of low birth weight, premature and cesarean born infants for women over the age of 
35. Reduction in maternal age at first birth is one main channel to the improved birth outcomes for 
these women.  
This paper also studies the impact of the PFL policy on the labor market outcomes of women after 
child birth. The literature shows that women especially with higher maternal age at first birth reveal 
more absenteeism from work and reduction in hours worked (Herr, 2008). Results show that this 
policy improved labor market attachment by increasing the likelihood of employment after 
childbirth. However, this policy reduces weeks of work after child birth in the year following 
childbirth which is because of an increase in leave taking that has been well documented in the 
related literature (e.g. Berger and Waldfogel, 2003; Baum and Ruhm, 2013; Rossin et al, 2013; 
Espinola-Arredondo and Mondel, 2010). Results are robust to a wide range of controls and 
robustness checks including different samples and data sets of Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS – USA), synthetic control method and falsification tests. 
5.2 Pollution and Infant Health: Evidence from the Oil Spill of the Gulf of Mexico 
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of the largest oil spill in the U.S history in the Gulf of Mexico 
in 2010 on air quality and newborns’ health outcomes. Oil spill of 2010 is considered as an 
exogenous shock that affected coastal counties and parishes of Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Texas. Using daily averages of main air pollutants including N02, PM10, SO2, and 
CO form Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a Difference in Difference methodology, 
we find that oil spill of 2010 reduces air quality. Next, using Vital Statistics data from National 
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Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and a Difference in Difference methodology, we find that oil 
spill increases the incidence of low birth weight (<2500 gr) and premature births (<37 weeks of 
gestation). It also decreases the gestation in weeks and birth weight in grams of babies born in 
coastal counties after oil spill of 2010. Heterogeneity effects reveal more pronounced adverse 
health impacts for back mothers, less educated mothers, unmarried, and mothers less than 20 years 
old. The paper has important policy implications as certain mothers are more affected by the oil 
spill. Our results point to avoidance measures that certain mothers can successfully apply against 
negative impacts of pollution. Results are robust to a wide range of controls and robustness checks. 
5.3 Party affiliation and Public Spending: Evidence from U.S. Governors 
It is commonly believed that Democrats support social policies, favor higher government 
involvement and are more likely to spend higher share of their budget on education and health. 
However, literature is ambiguous whether party affiliation of governors matters in budgetary 
decisions. Exploiting gubernatorial election results from 1960 to 2012 and a Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD), this paper investigates the partisan impact of governors on total 
spending and allocative budgetary decisions over five key sectors of education, health/hospitals, 
public safety, social welfare, and we combine the other sectors (other sectors are combined as 
follow: highway, natural resources, parks and recreation, interest on general debt, and 
governmental administration). We find no significant impact of political party of governors on 
total spending, only on allocation of funds. Results show that Democratic governors spend 
respectively 2.4 and 4.9 percentage points higher on education and health/hospitals sectors and 2.3 
percentage points less on other sectors compare to Republican governors. This is important 
because the literature documents benefits to higher funding to education and health (e.g., Barro 
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1991; Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein 2010; Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson 2002; Martin et al. 
2012). Our results support political difference between political parties and reject the median voter 
theorem for allocation of spending. Results are robust to a wide range of controls and numerous 
RDD robustness checks including non-parametric and parametric estimates using different orders 
of polynomials (linear, quarter, cubic, and quartic), and falsification tests.   
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
A. Mothers Age 20 to 29    B. Mothers Age 30 to 34 
  
 C. Mothers Age 35 to 39    D. Mothers Age 40 to 44 
  
Figure A.1: Trends of California vs. Synthetic California in Proportion of Mothers at Different Age Groups 
Including age 20 to 29 (A-top left), age 30 to 34 (B-top right), age 35 to 39 (C-bottom left), age 40 to 44 
(D-bottom right) 
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Table A.1: DID Estimates for Proportion of Women at Different Age Ranges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Age 20-24 Age 25-29 Age 30-34 Age 35-39 Age 40-44 
CA*Post 2004 -0.00392 -0.00562 0.0695*** -0.0548*** -0.123*** 
 (0.00639) (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0172) (0.0260) 
      
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.4504 0.2673 0.1816 0.0828 0.0172 
Note: Outcome variable is proportion of women at 5 years interval age groups at county level. Year 
2004 and TDI states are dropped. Also, sample is limited to mothers with first live births. There are 
20854 counties in the sample. All estimates include control variables. All regressions include time 
and state fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are 
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).
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Table A.2: DID Estimates for Heterogeneity of Infant Health Outcomes for Women Over 35 Years Old 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All Education>12 Education<=12 white black Hispanic married unmarried 
Premature -0.0155***  -0.0116*** -0.0117*** -0.0144*** -0.0146*** -0.0103*** -0.0107*** -0.0222*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0025) 
 Pre-Treatment Mean 0.1183 0.1162 0.1293 0.1130 0.1714 0.1309 0.11618 0.13038 
         
Gestation in weeks 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0020*** 0.0003*** 0.00046*** 0.00044*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00008) (0.00012) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 38.7030 38.7319 38.5871 38.8237 38.0516 38.5506 38.7265 38.5715 
         
LBW (<2500 g) -0.0114*** -.0071*** -.0101*** -.0107*** -.0109*** -.0031** -.0062 -.0200 
 (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0012) (0.00117) (0.0019) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.0999 0.0972 0.1090 0.0912 0.1691 0.1037 0.0972 0.1150 
         
LBW (<1500 g) -0.0047*** -0.0046*** -0.0011*** -0.0057*** -0.0026** 0.0004 -0.0043*** -0.00302*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.00075) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.00045) (0.0008) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.0192 0.0182 0.0219 0.0168 0.0503 0.0229 0.01804 0.0258 
         
BW (g) 0.0145*** .0022 .0169*** .0075** .0341*** .0044 .00438* .03812*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0044) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 3253.171 3261.982 3219.233 3299.514 3044.799 3245.45 3259.828 3216.772 
         
C-section -0.0314*** -.0321*** -.0173*** -.0487*** -.0019 -.0064 -.0290*** -.02658*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.00269) (0.0025) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.4420 0.4342 0.4773 0.4221 0.5210 0.4901 0.4391 0.4579 
Note: Outcome variables are infant health outcomes for mothers over 35 years old with different socioeconomic characteristics. Year 2004 and 
TDI states are dropped. Also, sample is limited to mothers with first live births. There are 11,574,452 mothers with first live births in the sample. 
All regressions include time and state fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. Sources: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA) and U.S. Census Bureau.
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Table A.3: DID Estimates for Robustness check with IPUMS-USA Sample of Eldest Child Less than 
One Year Old 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All <35 yrs >35 yrs >35 yrs & 
College 
>35 yrs & 
Some 
College 
>35 yrs & 
High School 
& less 
CA*Post 2004 -0.3806*** -0.1461*** -1.5852*** -1.8845*** -0.7842*** -0.6541*** 
(w working cond.) (0.0374) (0.0376) (0.1223) (0.1032) (0.0698) (0.0985) 
       
Pre-Treatment Mean 29.7597 28.4995 38.4955 38.4701 38.6412 38.3703 
       
CA*Post 2004 -0.3819*** -0.1618*** -1.5581*** -1.9899*** -0.8278*** -0.3818*** 
(w/o working cond.) (0.0349) (0.0355) (0.1299) (0.1090) (0.0632) (0.0907) 
       
Pre-Treatment Mean 29.4579 28.0608 38.5524 38.4777 38.7616 38.6108 
Note: Outcome variable is age of mother at first birth. Year 2004 and TDI states are dropped. Also, sample is 
limited to mothers with the eldest child less than one year old. First row shows the estimates for mothers with 
first live births who have worked any usual hours during previous year or during their pregnancy. There are 
75,321 mothers with first live births in this sample. Second row shows estimates without limiting sample to 
mothers who have worked any usual hours and includes 92,566 mothers with first live birth. Column one, two 
and three show estimates for all mother, mothers over 35, and mothers less than 35 years old. Column four, 
five, and six show results for new mothers over 35 years old with college degree, some college and high school 
or less respectively. All estimates include individual control variables. All regressions include time and state 
fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA). 
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Table A.4: DID Estimates for Robustness Check with USA-CPS Sample of Youngest Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All <35 yrs >35 yrs >35 yrs & 
College 
>35 yrs & 
Some 
College 
>35 yrs & 
High 
School & 
less 
CA*Post 2004 -0.1950*** 0.0094 -1.0718*** -1.4188*** -0.6194*** -0.2208*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0295) (0.1013) (0.0894) (0.0545) (0.0685) 
       
Pre-Treatment 
Mean 
30.7758 29.0823 38.5822 38.4909 38.6260 38.8023 
Note: Outcome variable is age of mother at first birth. Year 2004 and TDI states are dropped. Also, 
sample is limited to mothers with the youngest child less than one year old who have worked any 
usual hours during previous year or during their pregnancy. This sample includes 165,222 
observations. I investigate the impact of the PFL of California on age of mother at first birth. Column 
one shows estimate for all women aged 20 to 45 years old. Column two and three show results for 
women over 35 and less than 35 years old. Column four, five, and six present results for mothers over 
35 years old with college degree, some college and high school or less respectively. All estimates 
include individual control variables. All regressions include time and state fixed effects and State 
time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA). 
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Table A.5: DID Estimates for Falsification Test for Women Over 35 Years Old 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Age of mom 
at first birth 
premature LBW 
(<2500 g) 
C-section Employmen
t 
2001 -0.0069 -.0038* 0.0003 0.0026 0.0396 
 (0.0088) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.1811) 
      
2002 -0.0169** -0.0031 -0.0013 -0.0035 -0.0198 
 (0.0082) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0037) (0.0904) 
      
2006 0.0122 .0027 0.0008 -0.0086 -0.0533 
 (0.0102) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0142) (0.0491) 
      
2007 0.0126 -0.0023 -0.0024* -0.0086 -0.0295 
 (0.0152) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0142) (0.0360) 
      
Note: Outcome variable is age of mother at first birth, premature (<37 weeks of gestation), low 
birth weight (<2500 g), C-section method of delivery, and employment for mothers over 35 years 
old. Year 2004 and TDI states are dropped. Also, sample is limited to mothers with first live births. 
I test for placebo year of enactment of PFL for different years. This table shows falsification test 
when I limit time frame to either pre 2004 or post 2004 for investigating placebo interactions of 
2001, 2002, and 2006, and 2007 respectively. All estimates include individual control variables. 
All regressions include time and state fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).
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Table A.6: DID Estimates using Synthetic Control Method 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Age of mom 
at first birth 
premature Gestation 
in weeks 
LBW 
(<2500 g) 
LBW  
(<1500 g) 
BW C-section Employmen
t 
All -0.0644** -0.0009 0.0001** -0.0017 -0.0003 0.0032 0.0008 0.0107 
 (0.0240) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0172) 
         
Less 35 0.1571*** 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0019 0.0044* 0.0247 
 (0.0375) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0233) 
         
Over 35 -1.9915*** -0.0084*** 0.0004*** -0.0107*** -0.0040*** 0.0145** -0.0314*** 0.0467** 
 (0.2371) (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0049) (0.0032) (0.0194) 
         
Note: Outcome variable is age of mother at first birth, premature (<37 weeks of gestation), gestation in weeks, low birth weight (<2500 gr 
and <1500gr), Birth weight, C-section method of delivery, and employment for mothers over 35 years old. TDI states are dropped. Also, 
sample is limited to mothers with first live births. This table shows the results for main outcome variables using synthetic control method. All 
estimates include individual control variables. All regressions include time and state fixed effects and State time trends. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. 
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS – USA). 
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Table B.1: Impact of oil spill on air pollutants – different time frame treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (6) 
 PM10 NO2 SO2 CO 
Oil spill 3.2291*** 8.4799** 1.2983 0.0400** 
(2006 to July 2010) (0.7993) (4.2257) (1.3613) (0.0157) 
N 618632 545067 676892 507206 
     
Oil spill 1.9088*** 8.8645*** 1.8385 0.0271* 
(2006 to October 2010) (0.6392) (2.1358) (1.4867) (0.0138) 
N 653217 574732 711361 531688 
     
Oil spill 2.3316*** 7.7164*** 2.0403 0.0112 
(2006 to 2010) (0.4366) (1.8603) (1.3787) (0.0139) 
N 676283 594041 735028 548877 
     
Oil spill 2.3903** 5.3163** 2.5891** 0.0154 
(2006 to 2011) (0.9840) (2.1909) (1.2399) (0.0174) 
N 817471 708705 872581 649020 
     
Oil spill 2.8945** 5.3285** 2.5391** 0.0162 
(2006 to 2012) (1.1203) (2.2072) (1.2415) (0.0178) 
N 966687 827971 1013119 747828 
Note: This table shows the impact of oil spill shock in April 20 2010 on air pollutants using 
different time periods. All the regressions include month, year and state fixed effects and state 
linear and quadratic time trends.  Standard errors are clustered at the county level.  * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: US EPA AirData. 
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Table B.2: The effect of the oil spill on infant health outcomes – different time frame treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
Oil spill  0.0071*** 0.0035** -0.0645** -8.3600*** 
2006 to July 2010 (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0276) (2.6985) 
N 16420787 16420787 16420787 16420787 
     
Oil spill  0.0059*** 0.0033*** -0.0587*** -9.3763*** 
2006 to Aug 2010 (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0205) (2.4690) 
N 16724095 16724095 16724095 16709052 
     
Oil spill  0.0050** 0.0017 -0.0593** -6.2200*** 
2006 to Oct 2010 (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0251) (2.2077) 
N 17319922 17319922 17319922 17319922 
Oil spill  0.0054* 0.0011 -0.0658** -3.1530 
2006 to Dec 2010 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0278) (2.4025) 
N 17894355 17894355 17894355 17878268 
     
Oil spill  0.0038* 0.0001 -0.0549*** -3.0701 
2006 to July 2011 (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0177) (2.2040) 
N 19869828 19869828 19869828 19852164 
     
Oil spill  0.0041** 0.0016* -0.0590*** -3.7539* 
2006 to Dec 2011 (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0178) (2.0823) 
N 21325543 21325543 21325543 21325543 
Oil spill  0.0075*** 0.0032*** -0.0752*** -9.5735*** 
2006 to Dec 2012 (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0206) (2.3829) 
N 24755728 24755728 24755728 24733717 
Note: This table shows the results for the impact of oil spill on infant health outcomes using 
different duration of the treatment. Control variables consist of mother characteristics including 
mother’s age, mother’s education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk factors of 
the pregnancy including birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and whether 
the child is male as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include 
month, year and state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Time period is 
2006 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
.01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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Table B.3: The effect of the oil spill on infant health outcomes at different time frames and trimesters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
Oil spill 0.0071*** 0.0035** -0.0645** -8.3600*** 
2006 to July 2010 (trimester 3) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0276) (2.6985) 
N 16420787 16420787 16420787 16420787 
     
Oil spill 0.0050** 0.0017 -0.0593** -6.2200*** 
2006 to Oct 2010 (Trimester 3 & 2) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0251) (2.2077) 
N 17319922 17319922 17319922 17319922 
Oil spill 0.0050** 0.0006 -0.0632*** -4.1701* 
2006 to Jan 2011 (Trimester 1, 2, &3) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0186) (2.4537) 
N 18171420 18171420 18171420 18171420 
Note: This table shows the results for the impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes at different 
time periods. Time spans have been limited to include women who have been exposed to the oil spill 
shock at different trimesters of pregnancy. Control variables consist of mother characteristics 
including mother’s age, mother’s education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk 
factors of the pregnancy including birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and 
whether the child is male as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include 
month, year and state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Time period varies by 
trimesters being considered. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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Table B.4: Impact of oil spill on infant health outcomes for women using different treatment groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
gulf states 0.0042** 0.0026*** -0.0390** -7.2311*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0154) (2.1837) 
N 18718974 18718974 18718974 18718974 
     
Coastal counties 0.0071*** 0.0035** -0.0645** -8.3600*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0276) (2.6985) 
N 16420787 16420787 16420787 16420787 
     
Narrow coastal counties 0.0067* 0.0042** -0.0817* -4.7851* 
 (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0494) (2.2865) 
N 15596495 15596495 15596495 15596495 
     
Coastal counties + close counties 0.0070*** 0.0029*** -0.0516*** -9.1293*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0195) (2.5464) 
N 17193064 17193064 17193064 17193064 
Note: This table shows the results for the impact of oil spill on infant health outcomes using 
different samples. Control variables consist of mother characteristics including mother’s age, 
mother’s education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk factors of the pregnancy 
including birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and whether the child is male 
as well as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include month, year and state 
fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Time period is 2006 to 2012. Standard 
errors are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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Table B.5: The effect of the oil spill on infant health outcomes for different coastal counties (CC) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Premature lbw2500 Gestation 
(weeks) 
BW 
(gr) 
Oil spill * CC of Alabama 0.0048 0.0153*** -0.0871* -23.5916** 
 (0.0102) (0.0035) (0.0514) (9.4652) 
     
Oil spill *CC of Florida 0.0007 0.0042* 0.0448 -8.7253 
 (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0427) (5.6868) 
     
Oil spill *CC of Louisiana 0.0184*** 0.0056* -0.1074*** -11.4115** 
 (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0304) (5.0019) 
     
Oil spill *CC of Mississippi -0.0040 0.0036 -0.1242* -11.7629 
 (0.0094) (0.0044) (0.0750) (10.7582) 
     
Oil spill * CC of Texas 0.0080*** 0.0013 -0.1055*** -6.1848 
 (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0351) (4.5982) 
     
N 16420787 16420787 16420787 16420787 
Note: This table investigates potential heterogeneity of the effect by states, using interaction 
terms. Control variables consist of mother characteristics including mother’s age, mother’s 
education, mother’s race, whether mother is married, and risk factors of the pregnancy including 
birth order, an indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and whether the child is male as well 
as father’s age group and father’s race. All the regressions include month, year and state fixed 
effects and state linear and quadratic time trends. Time period is 2006 to 2012. Standard errors 
are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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Table B.6: Heterogeneity effect of oil spill for women at their 3rd trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 all College Some 
college 
High School 
Or less 
Age  
over 35 
Age  
26-35 
Panel A       
premature 0.0071*** -0.0011 0.0011 0.0134*** -0.0095* 0.0106*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0031) 
       
LBW 0.0035** -0.0004 -0.0015 0.0063** -0.0023 0.0035 
 (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0022) 
       
gestation -0.0645** -0.0163 -0.0037 -0.0986*** -0.0306 -0.0934*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0329) (0.0303) (0.0342) (0.0460) (0.0286) 
       
BW -8.3600*** -6.7041 -8.0763 -11.8239** -1.0350 -9.2551*** 
 (2.6985) (4.7911) (5.6089) (5.0351) (7.4017) (3.5462) 
       
N 16420787 3151016 1996274 4761411 1831656 8067642 
Panel B       
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Age  
below 25 
White Black Hispanic Married Unmarried 
premature 0.0077** 0.0014 0.0131*** 0.0079** 0.0048** 0.0083*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0028) 
       
LBW 0.0053*** 0.0029* 0.0082 0.0017 -0.0002 0.0067** 
 (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0057) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0026) 
       
gestation -0.0494 -0.0171 -0.0452 -0.1104*** -0.0650** -0.0456* 
 (0.0314) (0.0215) (0.0422) (0.0423) (0.0303) (0.0274) 
       
BW -10.3457*** -5.6060 -7.0915 -11.5330* -3.3513 -12.0685*** 
 (3.8645) (4.0750) (7.4627) (6.0260) (4.1090) (3.5675) 
       
N 6521489 9111655 2259938 3810858 9924189 6496598 
Note: This table shows the results for the impact of the oil spill on infant health outcomes for 
mothers who have been exposed to the oil spill shock in their third trimester of pregnancy. Control 
variables consist of mother characteristics including mother’s age, mother’s education, mother’s 
race, whether mother is married, and risk factors of the pregnancy including birth order, an 
indicator for whether it is a multiple birth, and whether the child is male as well as father’s age 
group and father’s race. All the regressions include month, year and state fixed effects and state 
linear and quadratic time trends. Time period is 2006 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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Table B.7: The effect of the oil spill on age of mother at different birth orders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Parity-1 Parity-2 Parity-3 Parity-4 
more 
Age of mom at birth -0.0120 -0.0495 -0.0306 -0.0020 -0.0031 
 (0.0154) (0.0320) (0.0242) (0.0429) (0.0378) 
 22433230 8016125 7418661 4033840 2826865 
Note: This table shows the results for the effect of the oil spill on age of mother. Control variables 
consist of mother characteristics including mother’s age, mother’s education, mother’s race, whether 
mother is married, and risk factors of the pregnancy including birth order, an indicator for whether 
it is a multiple birth, and whether the child is male as well as father’s age group and father’s race. 
All the regressions include month, year and state fixed effects and state linear and quadratic time 
trends. Time period is 2006 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 4 
Table C.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean S.d. 
   
Total spending  10.819 1.134 
Share of spending on Education 0.331 0.068 
Share of spending on Health/Hospital 0.060 0.019 
Share of spending on Public Safety 0.030 0.011 
Share of spending on Social Welfare 0.160 0.065 
Share of spending on Other 0.419 0.090 
Note: Summary statistics of outcome variables including share of spending on education, 
health/hospitals, public safety, social welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The 
number of observations is 2343. 
Source: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011), and U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Table C.2: Summary Statistics for party switch 
 𝐷𝑡+1|𝑅𝑡 𝑅𝑡+1|𝐷𝑡 𝐷𝑡+1|𝐷𝑡 𝑅𝑡+1|𝑅𝑡 
Variables Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. 
Total spending 10.711 1.149 10.98 1.079 10.655 1.182 10.848 1.239 
Share of spending on Education 0.339 0.064 0.319 0.077 0.345 0.061 0.306 0.066 
Share of spending on Health/Hospital 0.068 0.018 0.054 0.015 0.064 0.016 0.055 0.013 
Share of spending on Public Safety 0.031 0.009 0.029 0.008 0.033 0.012 0.028 0.008 
Share of spending on Social Welfare 0.164 0.069 0.169 0.065 0.158 0.062 0.160 0.071 
Share of spending on Other 0.398 0.079 0.429 0.070 0.400 0.075 0.451 0.094 
Note: Summary statistics of outcome variables including share of spending on education, 
health/hospitals, public safety, social welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending when 
party switches. 
Source: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011), and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table C.3: Robustness check: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Predetermined 
Characteristics of the States and Governors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome Variables Linear 
polynomials 
Quadratic 
polynomials 
Cubic 
polynomials 
Quartic 
polynomials 
Log Personal income  0.0283 0.0143 0.0183 0.0205 
(million $) (0.0199) (0.0141) (0.0223) (0.0222) 
Log of Population 0.00296 0.00695 -0.00186 -0.00330 
 (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0179) (0.0163) 
Upper house majority 0.0423 0.0241 0.0426 0.0139 
 (0.0292) (0.0301) (0.0310) (0.0399) 
Lower house majority 0.0071 -0.0082 -0.0006 -0.0197 
 (0.0359) (0.0369) (0.0400) (0.0416) 
Both houses majority 0.0028 -0.0080 0.0051 -0.0152 
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0357) (0.0427) 
Female governor 0.0397 0.0422 0.0410 0.0410 
 (0.0246) (0.0256) (0.0278) (0.0292) 
Note: In this table, control variables regarding state characteristics (i.e. demographic and political 
characteristics of the states) are used as outcome variables. The explanatory variable is 
gubernatorial party of the governor. The number of observations is 2343. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau.  
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Table C.4: Summary Statistics – Democratic vs Republican Governors at Margin of victory of 5% 
 
 Democratic 
Governor 
 Republican 
Governor 
 Difference 
Variables  M SD  M SD  Diff SD 
Log Personal income (million $)  5.853 1.183  6.037 1.22364  -0.184 .104 
Log of Population  7.937 1.098  8.112 1.073  -0.176 .093 
House majority democrat  0.610 0.407  0.629 0.382  -0.019 .034 
Senate majority democrat  0.603 0.425  0.586 0.381  0.0169 .034 
Majority democrat both houses  0.660 0.413  0.672 0.366  -0.012 .033 
Female governor  0.074 0.174  0.052 0.145  0.022 .014 
Note: Summary statistics of control variables including log of population and personal income of the states, 
dummy variable whether majority of the state legislators in the Senate or House or both houses are 
Democrats or Republicans, and a dummy variable whether the governor is female. 
Source: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011), and U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Table C.5: Summary Statistics - Whole sample vs Margin of victory of 5% 
 
 Whole sample  Margin of victory 
(5%) 
 Difference 
Variables  M SD  M SD  Diff SD 
Log Personal income (million $)  6.001 1.130  5.925 1.221  0.076 .055 
Log of Population  8.065 1.027  8.015 1.080  0.050 .05 
House majority Democrat  0.633 0.346  0.613 0.323  0.021 .016 
Senate majority Democrat  0.602 0.353  0.597 0.328  0.006 .017 
Majority Democrat both houses  0.693 0.331  0.674 0.313  0.019 .016 
Female governor  0.052 0.145  0.067 0.125  -0.016 .007 
Note: Summary statistics of control variables including log of population and personal income of the 
states, dummy variable whether majority of the state legislators in the Senate or House or both houses are 
Democrats or Republicans, and a dummy variable whether the governor is female. 
Source: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011), and U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Table C.6: RD estimates for total spending and share of spending Using Different Order of 
Polynomials and optimal bandwidth procedures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Panel A       
Democratic Governor 0.0007 0.0230** 0.0498** 0.0329 -0.0148 -0.0244*** 
   Linear polynomials (0.0026) (0.0086) (0.0218) (0.0197) (0.0236) (0.0081) 
Democratic Governor -0.0009 0.0295*** 0.0490* 0.0276 -0.00919 -0.0303** 
   Cubic polynomials (0.0036) (0.0107) (0.0284) (0.0199) (0.0258) (0.0116) 
Democratic Governor -0.0006 0.0276** 0.0549* 0.0381* -0.00956 -0.0309** 
  Quartic polynomials (0.0037) (0.0105) (0.0274) (0.0223) (0.0260) (0.0115) 
Panel B       
Democratic Governor -0.0015 0.0251** 0.0693** 0.0451** 0.0169 -0.0311** 
IK bandwidth  
 
(0.0047) 
BW=  
12.033 
(0.0110) 
BW=  
13.032 
(0.0330) 
BW= 
 12.076 
(0.0200) 
BW= 
 15.201 
(0.0379) 
BW=  
7.520 
(0.0137) 
BW=  
9.437 
Democratic Governor -0.0016 0.0250** 0.0876** 0.0403** 0.0229 -0.0295** 
CCT bandwidth 
 
(0.0046) 
BW=  
14.28 
(0.0103) 
BW= 
14.260 
(0.0411) 
BW=  
9.414 
(0.0203) 
BW= 
 14.776 
(0.0295) 
BW=  
11.914 
(0.0110) 
BW=  
17.728 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, public safety, social 
welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The number of observations is 2343 for 
Panel A. The controls are the same as Table 4.3. Panel B use optimal bandwidth procedures of 
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (CCT) (2014), and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (IK) (2012).  There are 
1222 and 1367 observations for IK and CCT optimal bandwidth for RD estimates for Education. 
Number of observations for RD estimated for health/hospitals using bandwidth of IK and CCT are 
1181 and 943 respectively. Number of observations for Public Spending using bandwidth of IK and 
CCT are 1433 and 1396 respectively and 815 and 1222 for Social Welfare and 976 and 1597 for Other. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
.01 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table C.7: Regression Discontinuity Estimations for Shares of Spending & Total Spending 
Using Small bandwidth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Democratic Governor 0.0017 0.0361* 0.0889* 0.0393 -0.0788* -0.025 
BW=3 (0.0130) (0.0263) (0.0500) (0.0334) (0.052) (0.019) 
Democratic Governor -0.0027 0.0272* 0.0701** 0.0223 -0.0469 -0.0207* 
BW=5 (0.0080) (0.0164) (0.0339) (0.0237) (0.0293) (0.0124) 
Democratic Governor 0.0032 0.0237* 0.0671** 0.0214 0.0280 -0.0324** 
BW=10 (0.0052) (0.0133) (0.0267) (0.0185) (0.0217) (0.0140) 
Democratic Governor 0.0015 0.0236** 0.0640*** 0.0325** 0.0229 -0.0338** 
BW=12 (0.0046) (0.0117) (0.0228) (0.0159) (0.0208) (0.013) 
Democratic Governor 0.0010 0.0267** 0.0734*** 0.0444* 0.0003 -0.0275** 
BW=15 (0.0043) (0.0110) (0.0207) (0.0240) (0.0192) (0.013) 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, public safety, social 
welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. Number of observations for RD estimated 
using bandwidths of 3, 5, 8, 12, and 15 are 338, 540, 843, 1222, and 1425 respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Table C.8: Placebo RD Test: Regression Discontinuity Estimates on Outcome variables at Previous 
Term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Democratic Governor -0.0208 -0.0029 -0.0047 0.0215 -0.0152 0.00152 
   Linear polynomials (0.0231) (0.0121) (0.0266) (0.0230) (0.0251) (0.0092) 
Democratic Governor -0.0401 -0.0093 -0.0036 0.0153 0.0067 0.0011 
  Quadratic polynomials (0.0316) (0.0139) (0.0297) (0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0107) 
Democratic Governor -0.0275 -0.0131 0.00210 0.0180 -0.0007 0.0034 
  Cubic polynomials (0.0327) (0.0156) (0.0357) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0126) 
Democratic Governor -0.0337 -0.0230 0.0098 0.0224 0.0152 0.0043 
Quartic polynomials (0.0401) (0.0162) (0.0345) (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0129) 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health/hospitals, public safety, social 
welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The number of observations is 2343. The 
controls are the same as table 4.3.  In all specifications, state and year fixed effects are included. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
.01 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table C.9: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Total spending & Share of Spending by 
sectors: heterogeneity of the effect, if Democrats are in power in other office. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total 
Spending 
Education  Health/ 
Hospital 
Public 
Safety 
Social 
Welfare 
Other 
Panel A       
Democratic Governor  -0.0051 0.0204** 0.0513*** 0.0365*** 0.00345 -0.0256*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0086) (0.0162) (0.0130) (0.0173) (0.0072) 
Democratic Governor× 0.0137*** 0.0148 -0.0396 -0.0011 -0.0476 0.0097 
    Democratic President (0.0043) (0.0141) (0.0280) (0.0267) (0.0345) (0.0125) 
Panel B       
Democratic Governor  -0.0010 0.0293*** 0.0384* 0.0398*** -0.0234 -0.0272*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0090) (0.0182) (0.0140) (0.0191) (0.0072) 
Democratic Governor× 0.0026 -0.00453 0.0121 -0.0092 0.0159 0.0098 
    Majority Democrat both    houses (0.0041) (0.0169) (0.0418) (0.0229) (0.0315) (0.0136) 
Panel C       
Democratic Governor  -0.0071 0.0232** 0.0451** 0.0403*** -0.00301 -0.0319*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0098) (0.0196) (0.0151) (0.0201) (0.0080) 
Democratic Governor× 0.0140*** 0.0142 -0.0384 -0.0012 -0.0470 0.0108 
    Democratic President (0.0044) (0.0142) (0.0274) (0.0260) (0.0346) (0.0127) 
Democratic Governor× 0.0035 -0.00362 0.00966 -0.0093 0.0129 0.0106 
    Majority Democrat both houses (0.0041) (0.0167) (0.0424) (0.0230) (0.0314) (0.0136) 
Note: Outcome variables are the share of spending on education, health and hospitals, public safety, social 
welfare, and other sectors as well as log of total spending. The number of observations is 2343.  This table 
investigate heterogeneity of the effect of Democratic governors if Democrats are in power in other office. 
In all specifications, state and year fixed effects are included. Control variables are the same as Table 4.3.  
* p < 0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p < .01 
Sources: ICPSR 7757 (1995), Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (2011) and U.S. Census Bureau. 
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